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WEAVING FUNCTIONAL BRAIN IMAGING
INTO THE TAPESTRY OF EVIDENCE:
A CASE FOR FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING
IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURTS
Adam Teitcher*
Recent advances in brain imaging technologies allow researchers to
“peer inside” a defendant’s brain. Although functional neuroimaging
evidence is frequently used in civil litigation, federal courts have been
hesitant to admit it into evidence in criminal trials. Scholars and
commentators alike continue to debate the merits, detriments, and general
admissibility of functional neuroimaging evidence in the criminal context.
Meanwhile, federal judges repeatedly admit various forms of forensic
science into evidence without evaluating them under the appropriate
admissibility standards. This Note argues that this has created a double
standard for evidence admissibility. Functional neuroimaging evidence
may, in fact, be more scientifically reliable than some of the forensic
science evidence currently admitted at trial. Accordingly, this Note
proposes that judges should consider the disparity in evidentiary standards
when considering the admissibility of functional neuroimaging evidence,
and should carefully and fairly examine such evidence when proffered in
federal criminal trials.
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INTRODUCTION
At approximately 2:30 PM on March 30, 1981, six shots were fired
outside of the Washington Hilton Hotel. John Hinckley, Jr. attempted the
assassination of President Ronald Reagan, wounding the President and
three others. 1 During his trial fifteen months later, Hinckley’s defense
attorney called to the stand a radiologist who showed the jury a computer
axial tomography (CAT) scan depicting atrophy of Hinckley’s brain.2 With
the images projected on a screen in the courtroom, the doctor testified that
the atrophy was abnormal, suggesting “organic brain disease,” 3 a term used
to describe impaired mental functioning. Although the presiding judge
initially barred the images from being displayed in the courtroom for fear
that the jury might grant them too much weight, he later decided to allow
the images because they might help give the jury “a complete picture” of
the evidence bearing upon Hinckley’s guilt. 4 Three weeks later, the jury
found Hinckley not guilty by reason of insanity. 5
Since the Hinckley trial, the use of neuroscience in the courtroom has
drawn significant public attention. Although the potential uses for
functional neuroimaging in the courtroom have increased dramatically,6
actual use has not. Critics decry the use of neuroimaging as too nascent of
a science and too prejudicial or unreliable to meet admissibility standards,7
though some say it will meet admissibility standards in the near future.8
Proponents argue that functional neuroimaging evidence has significant
probative value and may even satisfy the federal evidentiary standard, and
should be admitted. 9
However, the debate surrounding the admissibility of functional
neuroimaging evidence seems misguided, and critics have held
neuroimaging evidence to unusually restrictive admissibility standards.10
At the very least, the admissibility standards have been applied to
functional neuroimaging evidence more strictly than they have been applied
to other forensic evidence offered in criminal trials.11 As the evidentiary
1. Howell Raines, Reagan Wounded in Chest by Gunman; Outlook ‘Good’ After 2Hour Surgery; Aide and 2 Guards Shot; Suspect Held, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1981, at A1.
2. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., CAT Scans Said to Show Shrunken Hinckley Brain, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 1982, at D19.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Hinckley Cleared but Is Held Insane in Reagan Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1982, at A1.
6. See generally Henry T. Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early
Look at the Field, 42 AKRON L. REV. 687 (2009) (describing numerous legal applications and
implications of the latest brain imaging technologies); David M. Eagleman, Neuroscience
and the Law, HOUS. LAW., Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 37, 37–40 (same); infra Part I.B.2.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See, e.g., Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 337 (2006); Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie,
The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 291–93 (2007).
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.B.2.
11. See infra Part I.D.4.
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maxim goes: “A brick is not a wall,”12 meaning that an item of evidence is
relevant to the overall structure of the evidence but is not in itself the basis
of all the evidence.
Accordingly, judges should view functional
neuroimaging as an evaluative tool, one of many bricks used to build the
tower of evidence. This would provide litigants with the tools necessary to
fully present and effectively argue their case and would allow juries to
evaluate and consider useful functional neuroimaging evidence during the
course of a trial. 13 After all, the purpose of scientific evidence is to
elucidate the facts by providing the fact-finder with all relevant information
to arrive at the truth,14 and functional neuroimaging likely can aid in that
endeavor. 15 Moreover, much of the scientific evidence currently admitted
in criminal trials—specifically, forensic individualization sciences—is
unreliable at best and dismal at worst. 16 Yet despite the scientific flaws and
unreliability, courts often admit such evidence, and sometimes by judicial
notice, without ever analyzing the evidence under the federal standard for
admissibility. 17 Much of forensic individualization evidence has little, if
any, scientific basis, but is often admitted based on a history of admission18
in lieu of evidentiary merits.19 Furthermore, admissibility challenges are
largely biased in favor of the prosecution.20
Judges should strongly consider admitting functional neuroimaging
evidence to balance the spectrum of evidence presented at trial and restore a
fair adversarial process. Of course, proper safeguards such as carefully
crafted jury instructions 21 should be instituted and maintained to prevent
12. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 339 (John W. Strong ed.,
abr. 4th ed. 1992) (describing the threshold for relevant evidence as low and that to be
relevant, evidence only needs to make a determination of the fact in question more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence).
13. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (“‘The Rules [of
Evidence] were designed to depend primarily upon lawyer-adversaries and sensible triers of
fact to evaluate conflicts.’” (quoting Jack Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 631 (1991))).
14. Id.
15. See Paul S. Appelbaum, The New Lie Detectors: Neuroscience, Deception, and the
Courts, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 460, 461 (2007) (arguing that judges must consider other
factors in addition to whether neuroscientific evidence passes the Daubert test, specifically,
“whether [the evidence] is likely to help the judge or jury resolve the legal issue in
question”).
16. See infra Parts I.D.1, I.D.3.
17. See Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals,
Tragic Flaws, and Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 JUDGES’ J., Fall 2005, at 16, 17, 29 (lamenting
that forensic sciences are notoriously unreliable yet rarely questioned under Daubert
standards); infra Part I.D.4, notes 223–25 and accompanying text.
18. This can be called an “evidentiary pedigree.” See infra notes 251–61 and
accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 224, 249–65 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 192, 234–37 and accompanying text.
21. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1200 & n.13 (2d Cir. 1978)
(describing jury instructions, which stated that the forensic evidence presented at trial was
for the jury’s “assistance only and could be rejected if found unreliable”); United States v.
Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that narrowly tailored jury
instructions could adequately address concerns that admitting forensic handwriting evidence
would unfairly prejudice the jury); Moriarty & Saks, supra note 17, at 31; Michael J. Saks,
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undue reliance on neuroimaging evidence, and independent external
regulatory entities should be established to supervise imaging
methodologies and govern their courtroom use. 22 Even when no forensic
individualization evidence is offered, judges should consider admitting the
evidence to avoid a double standard for admitting scientific evidence.23
This would ensure that the fact-finders—both juries and judges alike—have
the information necessary to help them arrive at a decision on the legal
issue at hand while using appropriate safeguards to narrow the scope of
functional neuroimaging evidence. 24
Much has been written about neuroscience evidence admissibility in
general, 25 but no work known to this author examines neuroscience
evidence in light of forensic individualization evidence. Doing so would
help guide judges on how to handle functional neuroimaging evidence to
maintain a fair and balanced adversarial system. As brain imaging
technology continues to improve, attempts to admit functional
neuroimaging evidence in criminal trials will likely increase. Especially in
light of a recent governmental report addressing the significant shortfalls of
forensic sciences and its continued use in the courtroom, 26 judges should
reassess their reluctance to admit functional neuroimaging into evidence in
criminal trials.
Part I of this Note introduces the reader to brain imaging in general and
describes neuroscience’s impact on the law. Part I.B discusses functional
neuroimaging, its numerous methodologies, and how it can be used in the
courtroom. Part I.C briefly surveys the federal admissibility standards for
scientific expert testimony, which governs functional neuroimaging
evidence. Because this Note focuses on applications of functional
neuroimaging to criminal law in federal cases, Part I.D discusses how the

Protecting Factfinders from Being Overly Misled, While Still Admitting Weakly Supported
Forensic Science into Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 609, 625 (2007) (suggesting that the
problem of misleading a jury with weak forensic evidence can be “ameliorated somewhat”
by appropriate jury instructions); E. Spencer Compton, Note, Not Guilty by Reason of
Neuroimaging: The Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions for Neuroscience Evidence in
Criminal Trials, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 333, 347–50 (2010) (arguing that careful jury
instructions should be used when dealing with neuroscience-based evidence).
22. See Laura Stephens Khoshbin & Shahram Khoshbin, Imaging the Mind, Minding the
Image: An Historical Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 171,
190–92 (2007).
23. Both functional neuroimaging and forensic individualization are types of scientific
evidence that should be subject to identical evidentiary standards. See infra notes 219–22
and accompanying text.
24. See Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1049 (noting that the jury is fully capable of
ignoring unhelpful evidence in its deliberations, and respecting the jury’s ability to do so);
see also Appelbaum, supra note 15, at 461 (noting the jury is the ultimate arbiter of the
truth).
25. The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience has
compiled, and continues to update, an exhaustive annotated bibliography of past and current
literature on the subject of neuroscience and the law. See Law and Neuroscience
Bibliography, MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON LAW & NEUROSCIENCE,
http://www.lawneuro.org/bibliography.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
26. See infra Part I.D.3–4.
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federal admissibility standards are currently applied to a foundational aspect
of criminal law evidence: forensic individualization sciences.
Part II outlines the arguments both in favor and against admitting
functional neuroimaging as evidence. This part includes arguments about
the evidence’s reliability, relevance, utility, and its potential to mislead,
confuse, or prejudice the jury. Part II also illustrates how functional
neuroimaging is currently analyzed under federal evidentiary standards by
federal criminal courts.
Part III suggests that judges should carefully consider admitting
functional neuroimaging evidence when offered in criminal trials,
especially in light of the quality of forensic evidence currently used in such
cases. This Note concludes by suggesting that although functional
neuroimaging evidence likely should be admissible, a governing body
should be created to establish guidelines to regulate its use.
I. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS
A. Structural and Anatomical Brain Imaging and Its Impact on the Law
Neuroimaging technology is not new. The first images of the brain
appeared in the early part of the twentieth century, 27 and, with the advent of
computerized tomography (CT), brain imaging technology rapidly
progressed as a full-fledged science in the early 1970s. 28 Technological
advancements soon led to the development of nuclear magnetic resonance
(NMR) imaging, known as “magnetic resonance imaging” (MRI). 29 With
the ability to produce exquisitely precise anatomic detail, MRI soon became
the preferred method for imaging the brain.30
MRI and other imaging technologies, such as positron emission
tomography (PET), electroencephalography (EEG), and single photon
emission computed tomography (SPECT), soon led to functional imaging
of the brain. 31 By the 1990s, neuroscience in general and neuroimaging
technologies in particular underwent such unprecedented growth that
President George H.W. Bush officially proclaimed the 1990s the “Decade
of the Brain.” 32

27. Erin D. Bigler, Introduction to NEUROIMAGING I: BASIC SCIENCE 1, 1 (Erin D. Bigler
ed., 1996).
28. Id. at 2.
29. Id.
30. Id.; Duane D. Blatter et al., A Normative Database from Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, in NEUROIMAGING I: BASIC SCIENCE, supra note 27, at 79 (“Without controversy,
magnetic resonance (MR) imaging achieves exquisite approximation of gross anatomy.”).
31. See Bigler, supra note 27, at 2. As opposed to structural brain imaging, functional
brain imaging allows neuroscientists to “peer inside” the living, working brain to detect
specific patterns of brain activation. Doing so provides insight into how the brain operates.
See ANDREW C. PAPANICOLAOU, FUNDAMENTALS OF FUNCTIONAL BRAIN IMAGING: A GUIDE
TO THE METHODS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS TO PSYCHOLOGY AND BEHAVIORAL
NEUROSCIENCE 5 (1998). This Note briefly reviews these technologies in Part I.B.1.
32. Proclamation No. 6158, 55 Fed. Reg. 29,553 (July 20, 1990).
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Structural and anatomical brain imaging is currently used for diagnostic
and investigative purposes, such as detecting brain lesions and improving
the diagnosis and treatment of neurological diseases. 33 It has also impacted
the legal system’s understanding of criminal responsibility. Consider the
case of Ron, a schoolteacher from Virginia.34 For forty years, Ron led a
conventional lifestyle without showing any signs of deviant behavior.35
Inexplicably, once he turned forty, Ron developed a keen interest in child
pornography and was subsequently arrested and convicted for making
sexual advances toward his stepdaughter. 36 He was remanded to a
rehabilitation clinic for sex offenders but was soon expelled because he was
unable to control his urges, propositioning everyone with whom he came
into contact.37 The day before Ron was scheduled to appear before the
court for sentencing, he admitted himself to the emergency room
complaining of a terrible headache.38 Ron told his doctors that he was
afraid he would rape his landlady and that he was unable to control
himself. 39 Eventually, the doctors ordered a brain MRI. What they found
shocked them. Ron had a tumor the size of an egg pressing against the right
frontal lobe of his brain. 40
After surgeons removed the tumor, Ron lost his uncontrollable urges and
his pedophilia, and he easily completed his rehabilitation program. 41 He
even moved back in with his wife and stepdaughter. 42 Seven months later,
his chronic headaches returned, and he secretly began collecting
pornography. 43 Another brain scan revealed that Ron’s tumor had partially
grown back. 44 A second surgical procedure successfully removed the
tumor and relieved him of his urges. 45
33. See Purvak Patel et al., The Role of Imaging in United States Courtrooms, 17
NEUROIMAGING CLINICS N. AM. 557, 557 (2007).
34. See Lewis Barker, Biological Psychology, in 2 21ST CENTURY PSYCHOLOGY: A
REFERENCE HANDBOOK 114, 114 (Stephen F. Davis & William Buskist eds., 2008); Doctors
Say Pedophile Lost Urge After Brain Tumor Removed, USA TODAY (July 28, 2003, 6:46
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2003-07-28-pedophile-tumor_x.htm.
35. Greely, supra note 6, at 700.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. SANDRA AAMODT & SAM WANG, WELCOME TO YOUR BRAIN: WHY YOU LOSE YOUR
CAR KEYS BUT NEVER FORGET HOW TO DRIVE AND OTHER PUZZLES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 174
(2008).
40. USA TODAY, supra note 34. The frontal lobe is known to regulate impulsive
behavior. Damage to the prefrontal cortex is associated with disinhibition, antisocial
behavior, and greater proclivity to break the law. See Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal
Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, in LAW & THE BRAIN 227, 233–34, 237–38 (Semir
Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006); Liane Young et al., Damage to Ventromedial
Prefrontal Cortex Impairs Judgment of Harmful Intent, 65 NEURON 845, 845 (2010).
41. Greely, supra note 6, at 701; USA TODAY, supra note 34.
42. USA TODAY, supra note 34.
43. Greely, supra note 6, at 701.
44. USA TODAY, supra note 34.
45. Id. Many other case studies describe how frontal lobe damage severely impacted an
individual’s behavior. See, e.g., Joseph H. Baskin et al., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand
Words? Neuroimaging in the Courtroom, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239, 250–63 (2007);

362

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

Ron’s case illustrates how brain imaging can and does impact societal
perceptions of criminal responsibility. If not for the egg-sized tumor
pressing against his brain, Ron most likely would have been incarcerated
for his “moral failing.” 46 Instead, when the MRI revealed the tumor in his
brain, Ron received a second chance and escaped prosecution even though
he broke the law. 47 A case like Ron’s challenges conventional notions of
criminal responsibility for offenders with demonstrated physical abrasions
or defects in the brain. Although brain tumors do not conclusively cause
immoral behavior or make one unable to abide by the law, 48 a causal
relationship is likely. 49 This is especially true when a physical abrasion or
tumor such as Ron’s afflicts an individual. 50 However, admitting evidence
of brain damage or dysfunction absent any physical or “external” factor51 is
more problematic. It is in this context that functional brain imaging enters
the discussion.
B. Functional Brain Imaging and Its Impact on the Law
Functional brain imaging is used frequently in cognitive neuroscience,
which is “the field of scientific endeavor that is trying to understand how
the brain enables the mind.” 52 As brain imaging technologies progress,
cognitive neuroscientists use functional brain imaging to study the human
brain in action. 53 This provides doctors and scientists with the tools to help

O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1265, 1295–96 (2007).
46. Barker, supra note 34, at 114.
47. See Greely, supra note 6, at 701. In Virginia, making sexual advances toward a
minor is a felony, as is possession of child pornography. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370(A)
(2010) (sexual advances toward minors); § 18.2-374.1:1(A) (possession of child
pornography).
48. See Yaling Yang et al., Brain Abnormalities in Antisocial Individuals: Implications
for the Law, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 65, 74 (2008) (“[T]he causal relationship between
structural/functional deficits and antisocial behavior remains unclear.”).
49. See, e.g., Sapolsky, supra note 40, at 239 (“What the literature about the [prefrontal
cortex] shows is that there is a reductive, materialistic neurobiology to the containment,
resulting in the potential for volitional control to be impaired just as unambiguously as any
other aspect of brain function. It is possible to know the difference between right and wrong
but, for reasons of organic impairment, to not be able to do the right thing.”).
50. See, e.g., Young et al., supra note 40, at 845–46 (finding that patients with lesions in
their ventromedial prefrontal cortex—understood to be an essential moral-processing center
in the brain—have difficulty delivering normal moral judgments and instead view attempted
harms as morally permissible); see also Fairchild v. Workman, 579 F.3d 1134, 1150–51
(10th Cir. 2009) (suggesting that if the defendant’s lawyer had presented the jury with
evidence of physical brain damage as a partial explanation for the defendant’s crime, it
“could have provided an important explanation for the jury”).
51. See Greely, supra note 6, at 701 (suggesting that a brain tumor may be considered an
“external cause” even though it is inside one’s skull).
52. Michael S. Gazzaniga, What Is Cognitive Neuroscience?, in A JUDGE’S GUIDE TO
NEUROSCIENCE: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 2, 2 (Andrew S. Mansfield ed., 2010)
[hereinafter A JUDGE’S GUIDE].
53. Id. at 3.
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them diagnose brain damage or disease when physical damage is absent.54
But as critics of functional brain imaging point out, the results of these
scans are not entirely dispositive—a causal relationship between specific
brain functionality and criminal behavior has not yet been definitively
determined. 55 The problem is less pressing when the results of functional
brain scans are coupled with results indicating structural brain damage. 56
Nevertheless, functional brain imaging can significantly impact the law in
its own right. 57
1. Methods of Functional Brain Imaging
Functional neuroimaging helps scientists understand brain activity by
measuring various biochemical and physiological events occurring within
the brain. 58 Specifically, scientists measure the rate and volume of blood
flow in areas of the brain involved in specific aspects of cognitive
functioning and the rate of oxygen consumption in those areas (called a
hemodynamic response), 59 or changes in various electrical currents.60
While structural imaging captures a snapshot of the brain at one point in
time, functional imaging tracks patterns of metabolic activity in the brain
over a period of time. 61 Functional brain imaging is thus categorically
different than structural brain imaging.
Generally, functional brain scans operate as follows: a subject is
presented with a situation or performs a specific task, and researchers
record the changes in the subject’s brain activity as the subject responds or
performs the task. Because the changes in brain activity are usually
localized and occur over a measurable span of time, the scans yield spatiotemporal brain data.62 The data is then compared with statistical maps of
54. See Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional
Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1119, 1127–28 (2010).
55. See MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN 87–102 (2005); Lydia D. Johnson,
Guilty or Innocent? . . . Just Take a Look at My Brain—Analyzing the Nexus Between
Traumatic Brain Injury and Criminal Responsibility, 37 S.U. L. REV. 25, 30–32 (2009);
Stephen J. Morse, Moral and Legal Responsibility and the New Neuroscience, in
NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 33, 33–34 (Judy
Illes ed., 2006) [hereinafter NEUROETHICS]; infra notes 298–305 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Fulks v. United States, No. 4:02-992, 2010 WL 3069390, at *16 (D. S.C.
Aug. 3, 2010) (quoting a neuroscientist who testified that abnormalities in both brain
structure and function “explain a lot of the behaviors, and the cognitive and emotional
deficits” of the defendant).
57. See generally LAW, MIND AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough
eds., 2009); Oliver R. Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law and Cognitive Neuroscience, 6
ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 61 (2010); Read Montague, How Is Neuroscience Likely to Impact
Law in the Near Future?, in A JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 52, 60, 60–65; Adina Roskies,
How Is Neuroscience Likely to Impact the Law in the Long Run?, in A JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra
note 52, at 66, 66–70.
58. See PAPANICOLAOU, supra note 31, at xi–xii.
59. Snead, supra note 45, at 1285.
60. See PAPANICOLAOU, supra note 31, at 5.
61. See id. at 4–6.
62. Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed,
2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶ 18.
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“normal” brain activity63 or the subject’s own baseline brain activity64 by
subtracting the normal or baseline reading from the data obtained from the
experimental scan.65 The varying degrees of statistically significant
metabolic change are color coded to identify easily and differentiate
between levels of activity. 66 This technique identifies areas of the brain
engaged in specific mental tasks. 67 What follows is a brief overview of the
various methods of functional brain imaging, including PET, SPECT, EEG,
quantitative electroencephalography (qEEG), functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), Brain Fingerprinting (BF), and finally, Brain
Electrical Oscillations Signature Test (BEOS).
a. Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and Single Photon Emission
Computed Tomography (SPECT)
PET and SPECT are older methods of functional brain imaging than the
fMRIs of today. 68 For PET and SPECT scans, the subject is injected with
organic, radioactive molecules called tracers, which are then dispersed
throughout the brain according to metabolic need. 69 When metabolized, the
molecules emit gamma rays, which are then detected and interpreted by
computers and used to construct three-dimensional models of the working
brain. 70 Researchers can use the data from multiple readings collected over
a brief time span to determine which areas of the brain are involved in
different types of brain activity with a high degree of specificity. 71 Because
PET scans measure localized blood volume in specific tissues, they
effectively detect nuanced characteristics of specific neurodegenerative
diseases. 72
Like PET, SPECT requires injecting radioactive tracers into the subject’s
bloodstream. The radioactive isotopes have longer half-lives, allowing
SPECT scans to generate images for longer periods of time while exposing

63. Donald Reeves et al., Limitations of Brain Imaging in Forensic Psychiatry, 31 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 89, 90 (2003) (“Statistical maps of brain activity are a common and
popular way to illustrate how an individual brain compares with an average brain. A
statistical map is a probability function compared with a defined norm. In brain imaging, the
norm is obtained by pooling and averaging the brain images of normal people.” (citation
omitted)).
64. See PAPANICOLAOU, supra note 31, at 6–9.
65. Id.; Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1136 n.63.
66. Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1136 n.63; Jones et al., supra note 62, ¶ 34. By
convention, brighter colors are used to depict differences in activity that are more
statistically significant.
67. Jones et al., supra note 62, ¶ 13.
68. PAPANICOLAOU, supra note 31, at 66 (describing PET scans); Brown & Murphy,
supra note 54, at 1136 (describing PET and SPECT as older scan methods).
69. PANANICOLAOU, supra note 31, at 67. Areas of the brain that are used more
intensely have higher metabolic rates. Id.
70. Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1136.
71. Jane Campbell Moriarty, Flickering Admissibility: Neuroimaging Evidence in the
U.S. Courts, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 29, 31–32 (2008).
72. Noel Shafi, Neuroscience and the Law: The Evidentiary Value of Brain Imaging, 11
GRADUATE STUDENT J. PSYCHOL. 27, 34 (2009).
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the subject to fewer injections than a PET scan. 73 The tradeoff, however, is
that SPECT does not map activity to specific brain areas as accurately as
PET scans. 74
Both PET and SPECT require injecting dangerous radioactive material
into human subjects. This prevents multiple trials over a short period of
time and thus diminishes the potential accuracy of the collected data.75
Furthermore, PET and SPECT are also often prohibitively expensive,
leading many researchers to use other less costly—and less dangerous—
techniques. 76
b. Electroencephalography (EEG)
Unlike PET and SPECT, EEG does not measure changes in blood flow in
the brain, nor does it measure metabolic rate. Instead, it records the
electrical current produced by brain activity measured via electrodes
attached to the subject’s scalp.77 However, EEG can only record electrical
activity occurring near the scalp and cannot probe deeper into the depths of
the skull and brain.78 It therefore lacks the spatial resolution and specificity
of PET and SPECT, but has better temporal resolution, meaning it is better
at detecting the nuanced timing differences of measured brain activity. 79
c. Quantitative Electroencephalography (qEEG)
qEEG is a computer-based method for interpreting EEGs. 80 Digitized
recordings of EEGs pass through a series of signal processing algorithms
and are classified as normal or abnormal based on numerous factors such as
frequency, events, or localization.81 qEEG can also identify specific
patterns of electrical activity associated with brain diseases or neurological
disorders, such as slow brain waves associated with dementia.82 While
qEEGs have the added analytical component and power of a computer
processor, the recording mechanism is still an EEG and thus has the same
temporal superiority and spatial deficiency.

73. Moriarty, supra note 71, at 32.
74. Mark Pettit, Jr., FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 319, 320 (2007).
75. See Snead, supra note 45, at 1284.
76. Id.
77. Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1136.
78. Id. at 1137.
79. Id. at 1136–37.
80. Scott T. Grafton, Has Neuroscience Already Appeared in the Courtroom?, in A
JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 52, at 54, 55.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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d. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)
The most prevalent method of functional brain imaging is fMRI. 83 The
scan detects hemodynamic changes in different areas of the brain. 84 The
amount of blood present in and flowing to a particular brain region, and the
amount of oxygen present in that blood, depends on the level and intensity
of brain activity occurring in that particular region of the brain.85
Researchers interpret increased blood flow as an increase in that region’s
cellular activity. 86 In other words, if a particular set of neurons increases in
activity, so will its metabolic rate. Like its structural and anatomical
counterpart, 87 fMRI is widely accepted and broadly used for medical and
research purposes. 88
This method has two major advantages over other forms of functional
neuroimaging. First, fMRI has much better spatial and temporal resolution
than both PET and SPECT, usually on the order of millimeters and
seconds. 89 The brain’s hemodynamic response rises and falls over a period
of a few seconds, yet fMRI can measure latency differences as small as a
few hundred milliseconds.90 Although the temporal resolution of fMRI is
somewhat inferior to EEG and qEEG, its spatial resolution is far superior.
Of the available neuroimaging techniques, scholars and researchers alike
consider fMRI to provide the best balance of temporal and spatial
resolution, 91 and the technology continues to improve. 92 Second, unlike
PET and SPECT, fMRI is noninvasive since it does not require injecting
radioactive isotopes into subjects. 93 Researchers can therefore conduct

83. Snead, supra note 45, at 1284.
84. PAPANICOLAOU, supra note 31, at 47–49.
85. Id.; John C. Gore, Principles and Practice of Functional MRI of the Human Brain,
112 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 4, 4–5 (2003).
86. Technically speaking, levels of oxygenated hemoglobin in the blood in specific brain
areas decrease compared to the levels of deoxygenated hemoglobin in the same area.
PAPANICOLAOU, supra note 31, at 48; Snead, supra note 45, at 1285.
87. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing medical and research uses of
MRI).
88. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1127–28; Marcus Raichlie, What Is an
fMRI?, in A JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 52, at 5, 6 (“A recent check on the number of
scientific publications in which fMRI . . . imaging was used revealed over twelve thousand
publications since its introduction in 1992.”).
89. Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibility and
Persuasiveness of fMRI, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN, supra note 57, at 23, 24; Snead, supra
note 45, at 1284.
90. Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need
for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 382 (2007).
91. Judy Illes & Eric Racine, Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge
Informed by Genetics, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar.–Apr. 2005, at 5, 7; Snead, supra note 45, at
1286.
92. Powerful new tools of statistical analysis are now being applied to fMRIs, yielding
an ever-deeper understanding of the human brain. Additionally, recent techniques have
combined both EEG and fMRI to produce an even more accurate imaging technology.
Annabelle Belcher & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Neurolaw, 1 WIRES COGNITIVE SCI. 18, 18,
21 (2010).
93. Snead, supra note 45, at 1285–86.

2011]

A CASE FOR FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING

367

multiple trials on subjects over a short period of time, enhancing the
reliability and validity of results.94
e. Brain Fingerprinting (BF)
BF is a more recently developed incarnation of EEG. BF “matches
information stored in the brain with information from the crime scene.”95
Electrodes placed on a subject’s scalp measure a specific electrical impulse,
a brain wave known as P300, that is emitted when a subject “recognizes and
processes an incoming stimulus that is significant or noteworthy,” but not if
the stimulus is “insignificant.” 96 BF purports to measure only information
processing and not emotional responses, and its creator claims it cannot be
manipulated or controlled by the subject.97 Therefore, BF claims to give an
accurate reading of “information present” or “information absent” in the
brain. 98 With the potential to be used for brain-based lie detection, BF has
already been proffered in at least two cases.99 However, there is
considerable controversy over its use for lie detection purposes. 100 In fact,
there is much debate within the scholarly community over whether any
brain-based lie detection should be used in the courtroom. 101
f. Brain Electrical Oscillations Signature Test (BEOS)
Like qEEG and BF, BEOS is a recycled use of EEG. Developed by an
Indian neuroscientist and built on techniques similar to BF, BEOS can
purportedly distinguish people’s memories of events they witnessed from
deeds they committed. 102 Electrodes are attached to the subject’s head and
the subject is presented with stimuli in the form of sentences or pictures.
Neutral stimuli are also included to normalize the software so that it can
94. Id.; cf. supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing danger of repeated PET and
SPECT scans).
95. Interview with Dr. Lawrence Farwell: Frequently Asked Questions About Brain
Fingerprinting
Testing,
BRAIN
FINGERPRINTING
LABORATORIES,
http://brainwavescience.com/FreqAskedQuestions.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
96. Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories:
Scientific Procedure, Research, and
Applications, BRAIN FINGERPRINTING LABORATORIES, http://brainwavescience.com/
TechnologyOverview.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Iowa 2003); Slaughter v. State, 2005
OK CR 6, 108 P.3d 1052, 1054 (Okla. Crim. App.).
100. Compare Greely & Illes, supra note 90, at 387–88 (documenting the shortcomings
of brain fingerprinting and how it should not be used for lie detection in courts), with Judy C.
Barillare, Comment, As Its Next Witness, the State Calls . . . the Defendant: Brain
Fingerprinting As “Testimonial” Under the Fifth Amendment, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 971, 1003–
04 (2006) (arguing that BF may have some pitfalls, but it has the potential to be an effective
tool in ensuring justice in certain circumstances).
101. See generally Jane Campbell Moriarty, Visions of Deception: Neuroimages and the
Search for Truth, 42 AKRON L. REV. 739 (2009) (arguing that fMRI-based lie detection is
currently insufficiently reliable to be used in court); infra note 115.
102. Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts Is Debated, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A10.
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distinguish memories from normal cognitive function.103 The test claims to
detect both conceptual and experiential knowledge. 104 BEOS has already
been used in India to convict at least one person of murder.105
2. Functional Brain Imaging in the Courtroom
Functional neuroimaging has serious implications for many legal issues.
Researchers have found that several brain regions are functionally impaired
in antisocial, psychopathic, and aggressive individuals. 106 Findings such as
these have the potential to redefine many legal concepts such as mens
rea, 107 addiction, 108 criminal responsibility, 109 and competency to stand
trial 110 or be sentenced. 111 Functional neuroimaging also has implications
for privacy, 112 bias detection,113 prediction of future criminal behavior,114
and lie detection. 115 Functional neuroimaging certainly has many potential
103. Id.
104. Johnson, supra note 55, at 34–35.
105. Id.
106. See Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, The Law and the Brain: Judging
Scientific Evidence of Intent, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 243, 268 (1999) (citing studies);
Yang et al., supra note 48, at 74. See generally Adrian Raine & Yalin Yang, The
Neuroanatomical Bases of Psychopathy: A Review of Brain Imaging Findings, in
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHY 278, 278 (Christopher J. Patrick ed., 2006) (finding functional
brain abnormalities in psychopathic individuals); Sapolsky, supra note 40, at 236–38; John
Matthew Fabian, Neuropsychological and Neurological Correlates in Violent and Homicidal
Offenders: A Legal and Neuroscience Perspective, 15 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 209
(2010); Young et al., supra note 40.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, No. CR 06-00079, 2009 WL 424583, at *5–6,
12 (D. Haw. Feb. 20, 2009) (suggesting that fMRI and EEG could provide, and possibly with
sufficient reliability, evidence of a defendant’s inability to form requisite intent). See
generally Brown & Murphy, supra note 54.
108. See Floyd E. Bloom, Does Neuroscience Give Us New Insights into Drug Addiction?
in A JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 52, at 42, 42–45 (suggesting that functional neuroimaging
will help scientists understand addiction, which will likely effect changes in both law and
policy regarding addiction).
109. Adrian Raine, From Genes to Brain to Antisocial Behavior, 17 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 323, 327 (2008) (suggesting that criminals with brain dysfunction
should not be held criminally responsible for their actions).
110. United States v. Kasim, No. 2:07 CR 56, 2008 WL 4822291, at *19–20 (N.D. Ind.
Nov. 3, 2008) (using SPECT scan to determine competency to stand trial), supplemented by
2010 WL 339084 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 2010).
111. United States v. Gigante, 996 F. Supp. 194, 229, 237–38 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (admitting
PET scan to show defendant’s competency to be sentenced, but ultimately finding it
unpersuasive).
112. See, e.g., Roskies, supra note 57, at 67 (“Privacy law is apt to become important
with respect to these technologies.”); Stacey A. Tovino, The Confidentiality and Privacy
Implications of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 844
(2005).
113. See, e.g., Eagleman, supra note 6, at 39; Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation,
Privacy, and Property: Some Possible Legal and Social Implications of Advances in
Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE
114, 137–38 (Brent Garland ed., 2004) [hereinafter NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW].
114. Henry T. Greely, The Social Effects of Advances in Neuroscience: Legal Problems,
Legal Perspectives, in NEUROETHICS, supra note 55, at 245, 246–50.
115. See generally EMILIO BIZZI ET AL., USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT: SCIENTIFIC
AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS (2009) (discussing implications of neurological-based lie
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uses in the legal realm. Yet there remains an ever-important hurdle for it to
clear. Before any evidence, whether neuroscientific or otherwise, can be
used in the courtroom, it must pass the standards for evidence admissibility.
C. Admissibility Standards: The Daubert Trilogy and the Federal Rules of
Evidence
Although there are numerous legal applications of functional
neuroimaging, if it is to be presented at trial, it must first clear an
admissibility hurdle. This section discusses the current federal standard for
admitting scientific evidence.
1. The “Daubert Trilogy”
The current standard for scientific evidence and expert testimony
admissibility follows what is collectively known as the “Daubert
trilogy.” 116 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 117 the U.S.
Supreme Court declared that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
(Rules) superseded the “general acceptance” test from Frye v. United
States. 118 The Frye “general acceptance” test had held that expert
testimony was admissible if it was generally accepted as reliable in the
relevant scientific community. 119 In Daubert, however, the Court ruled that
the appropriate standard was Rule 702, which said that scientific testimony
must be “not only relevant, but reliable,” thus removing the absolute
requirement that the scientific evidence be “generally accepted” in the
relevant scientific community. 120 Daubert requires judges to determine
whether the “reasoning or methodology” underlying the evidence is
“scientifically valid” such that it can be properly applied to the particular
case. 121 Because the inquiry is “a flexible one,” 122 judges have discretion
detection); Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie
Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 359 (2007) (discussing
constitutional concerns of brain-based lie detection); Leo Kittay, Note, Admissibility of fMRI
Lie Detection: The Cultural Bias Against “Mind Reading” Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV.
1351 (2007) (arguing that neurological lie detection should be admitted as evidence).
116. See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2004)
(identifying the “Daubert trilogy”).
117. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
118. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
119. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584–85, 587. Although Rule 702 became the federal standard,
the states have disagreed regarding the proper standard to apply. Most adopted Daubert or a
similar standard, but a minority of states and the District of Columbia continue to use the
Frye test. A few states have combined the Daubert and Frye tests, and still others have
created their own tests entirely. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1176; Maxine D.
Goodman, A Hedgehog on the Witness Stand—What’s the Big Idea?: The Challenges of
Using Daubert to Assess Social Science and Nonscientific Testimony, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 635,
644 n.36 (citing sources that illustrate jurisdictional differences in standards for expert
testimony, and listing states that still use the Frye test); Patel et al., supra note 33, at 560–61.
120. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
121. Id. at 593; see also Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the
Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 9, 11–12
(Fed. Judicial Ctr., 2d ed. 2000).
122. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
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when acting as “gatekeepers” to ensure that the scientific testimony is both
relevant and reliable.123
As the Court noted, “[i]n a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary
reliability will be based upon scientific validity.” 124 Thus, for purposes of
satisfying Daubert, scientific reliability depends on whether an
investigatory method passes muster as a valid scientific process. The Court
determined that when considering the admissibility of scientific evidence, a
judge must focus solely on the principles and methodologies utilized in the
scientific process and not on the conclusions drawn from those
methodologies.125
To help judges determine if the proffered evidence is scientifically valid
(i.e., based on the scientific method), the Court suggested a number of
guidelines for judges to consider. First, the underlying method should be
empirical, meaning that the technique should be testable and open to
scientific criticism. 126 Second, judges should consider whether the
technique is subject to peer review and publication.127 Third, the technique
should have a known or potential rate of error. 128 Fourth, judges should
consider whether the technique is standardized or whether regulations
control its use. 129 Finally, with a nod to the Frye test, the Court included
general acceptance of the methodology within the scientific community as a
factor for courts to consider, although this factor is no longer dispositive. 130
The Court noted that many factors will bear on an admissibility inquiry
and it did “not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.” 131 Thus,
the Court was careful to grant judges the flexibility to remain relatively
subjective in their inquiry while providing an identifiable framework in
which to operate.
In its conclusion, the Court addressed the dissenters’ concerns about the
The dissenting Justices worried that
decision’s lasting impact. 132
abandoning Frye would “result in a ‘free-for-all’ in which befuddled juries
would be confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific

123. Id. at 589 & n.7.
124. Id. at 590 n.9.
125. Id. at 595.
126. Id. at 593. This is an important factor to determine whether evidence is scientifically
valid because testing and criticism is part of scientific inquiry, which leads to further
scientific progress. See David Goodstein, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 121, at 67, 70 (“[S]cience makes progress uniquely by
proving that good ideas are wrong so that they can be replaced by even better ideas.”).
127. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. However, the Court was keen to emphasize that
“[p]ublication . . . is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with
reliability . . . and in some instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not have
been published.” Id.
128. Id. at 594.
129. Id.
130. Id.; Berger, supra note 121, at 12–13 (“[G]eneral acceptance of the methodology
within the scientific community is no longer dispositive . . . .”).
131. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. Additional guidelines are mentioned in the advisory
committee’s notes to Rule 702. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes.
132. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
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assertions.” 133 The Court dismissed these concerns by reaffirming its faith
in the adversary system of the courtroom, labeling naysayers as “overly
pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system
generally.” 134 Clarity would be achieved through “[v]igorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on
the burden of proof.” 135
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,136 the Supreme Court announced that
the correct standard of review for an evidentiary ruling is abuse of
discretion. 137 In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer urged trial judges to
take appropriate measures to manage their gatekeeping duties.138 Justice
Breyer advocated appointing reputable experts, or “special masters,” to help
determine the scientific validity, and thus evidentiary reliability, of
scientific evidence.139
The last of the “Daubert trilogy,” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael140
extended Daubert to encompass all expert testimony. 141 Kumho Tire
involved the analysis and deposition testimony of a tire-failure expert who
drew his conclusions after visually inspecting the tires. 142 The Court found
that a judge’s gatekeeping duties extend to all expert testimony involving
“scientific,” “technical,” or “other specialized” knowledge. 143 Thus, today,
whether expert-based testimony is scientific in nature or based on “skill- or
experience-based observation,” the same evidentiary standard applies.144
The Court also reiterated that Daubert’s guiding factors were “meant to
be helpful, not definitive,” and that trial courts have discretion in deciding
whether or not evidence is admissible, because that determination is largely
fact-dependent. 145 Hence, the notion that the Daubert factors must be
applied to every case was categorically rejected.146
The Daubert admissibility standard can be distilled to a few key points.
Trial judges must assess the relevance of the proffered evidence.147 They
133. Id.
134. Id. at 596.
135. Id.; see also Pettit, Jr., supra note 74, at 325. The Court also mentioned that judges
can issue directed verdicts or grant summary judgment as “conventional devices” of the
courtroom to protect against the intrusion and preponderance of “pseudoscientific” science.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
136. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
137. Id. at 139.
138. Id. at 150 (Breyer, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 149–50; see FED. R. EVID. 706. However, judges have been reluctant to
appoint such experts. See, e.g., Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572,
590, 612–14 (9th Cir. 2000) (Tashima, J., dissenting) (noting that court-appointed experts
are appropriate in “rare” cases, and there is fear they could take away from the role of the
judge or jury).
140. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
141. Id. at 141.
142. Id. at 146.
143. Id. at 141.
144. See Berger, supra note 121, at 18.
145. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150–51; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993).
146. See Berger, supra note 121 at 19.
147. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.
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must also determine the scientific validity underlying the evidence’s
methodology, 148 and they may appoint an expert to assist the court if
necessary. 149 This applies to all forms of expert testimony, holding each
expert to the same standards of “intellectual rigor.”150 Once admitted,
evidentiary rulings are subject to the deferential “abuse of discretion”
standard of review, effectively granting trial judges the final say in
evidentiary matters. 151 The story of scientific evidence admissibility,
however, does not end there.
2. Post-Daubert Trilogy: The Federal Rules of Evidence
Like most scientific evidence, functional neuroimaging evidence requires
an expert to interpret the scans for the jury or testify about the results of the
scan. 152 The Rules regulating expert testimony are therefore pertinent to
this discussion.
In 2000, Rule 702, which currently requires that any expert testimony
“assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue,” 153 was amended to reflect the Daubert trilogy. 154 The amendment
called for judges to engage in three general categories of inquiry when
acting as gatekeepers. 155 The expert testimony must be “based upon
sufficient facts or data,” it must be the “product of reliable principles and
methods,” and the testimony must be “reliably [applied] to the facts of the
case.” 156 However, it does not require that the evidence be “generally
accepted” within the relevant scientific community. Neither the Federal
Rules of Evidence nor the Daubert trilogy categorically restrict judges from
admitting evidence that is not uniformly accepted within the scientific
community.
Rule 403 also informs a discussion of brain scan admissibility. Even if
evidence is relevant, it may still be excluded “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or [if it is] misleading [to] the jury.” 157 Juries can be swayed by the
“impressive title[s]” of scientists in the courtroom, attributing greater
weight to their testimony than is deserved and creating problems of
sophistry. 158 Thus, while evidence may pass admissibility standards under
148. Id. at 592–93, 595.
149. Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 150 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring). See
generally Sheila Jasanoff, Hidden Experts: Judging Science After Daubert, in TRYING
TIMES: SCIENCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES AFTER DAUBERT 30, 30 (Vivian Weil ed., 2001).
150. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.
151. Id. at 142 (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143).
152. See Pettit, Jr., supra note 74, at 323 (“[B]rain-imaging evidence seems necessarily to
entail presentation by expert witnesses . . . .”).
153. FED. R. EVID. 702.
154. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes.
155. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER ET AL., EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES 719 (3d
ed. 2009).
156. FED. R. EVID. 702.
157. FED. R. EVID. 403.
158. KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 209, 250 (1997).
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Daubert and Rule 702, a judge may still exclude evidence under Rule
403. 159 Rule 403 is important to the present discussion because some
critics worry that testimony about brain scans will provide an air of
infallibility and strongly prejudice or mislead a jury, what some refer to as
the “Christmas tree effect.” 160
Rule 704 also informs a discussion of functional neuroimaging
evidence. 161 It defines the scope of admissible expert testimony when the
expert testimony concerns a defendant’s mental state. According to the
rule, the expert may not testify as to whether a defendant definitively did or
did not have a specific mental state necessary for a specific crime because
“[s]uch ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.”162 While
Rule 704 has largely been subsumed by Rule 702’s requirement that the
testimony “assist the finder of fact”163 and by Rule 403’s protection against
misleading or confusing the jury, 164 it still stands to prevent experts from
testifying if they will “merely tell the jury what result to reach.”165
While theoretically simple, the practical impact of Daubert remains
unclear, and has created both confusion and controversy. 166 One study of
372 federal and 321 state criminal appellate cases from 1988 to 1999 found
no change in admissibility rates under Daubert as compared with the older
Frye standard. 167 Scholars and commentators argue that while judges often
cite Daubert in their analyses, the standard is not applied in any meaningful
way. 168 A recent report found that “[f]ederal appellate courts have not with
any consistency or clarity imposed standards ensuring the application of
scientifically valid reasoning and reliable methodology in criminal cases
involving Daubert questions.” 169
3. The Role of the Jury After Daubert
Daubert requires judges to act as gatekeepers of scientific evidence, but it
does not substitute them for the jury or for the adversarial legal system in

159. See, e.g., United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding evidence of
brain abnormality to be reliable and relevant but excluding it because of its potential to
mislead the jury); United States v. Mezvinsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d 661, 674–77 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(denying proffered PET scans due to their potential to mislead the jury).
160. See infra Part II.A.4 (presenting arguments that functional neuroimaging should be
excluded under Rule 403). But see infra Part II.B.5 (presenting counterarguments).
161. FED. R. EVID. 704.
162. Id.
163. FED. R. EVID. 702.
164. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s notes.
165. Id.
166. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 11
(2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT] (describing inconsistency among federal courts in
applying, misapplying, or not applying Daubert in criminal cases).
167. See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 478–79 (2005).
168. See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 11; Cheng & Yoon, supra note 167, at
479 n.25.
169. NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 11.
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general. 170 For example, the judge cannot decide whether an expert’s
testimony is factually correct, nor can the judge pass judgment on any
conclusions drawn by an expert from a particular methodology. 171 Rather,
it is for the jury to decide whether the expert is correct in his or her
assessment. 172 The judge must focus solely on how the expert arrived at his
or her opinion. 173
Although courts have inconsistently applied Daubert, 174 they have
consistently reaffirmed the jury’s role in assessing the reliability of
scientific evidence, finding that sufficiently probative evidence will not be
excluded despite its potential to mislead or confuse the jury. 175 After all,
“Rule 403 is a rule that favors admissibility.” 176 In United States v.
Starzecpyzel, 177 the court found that evidence was prejudicial because the
jury could attribute it “far greater precision and reliability” than is otherwise
appropriate. 178 However, the court did not exclude it under Rule 403,
stating that, “[w]hile the Court does not take the problem of prejudice
lightly, it is also important not to overreact to it.”179 The court took
protective measures to mitigate any potential prejudicial effect180 and
admitted the evidence, stating that “‘[t]he jury is intelligent enough, aided
by counsel, to ignore what is unhelpful in its deliberations.’”181 In that
170. See MUELLER, supra note 155, at 716. A defendant’s right to a trial by jury is an
underlying principle of our criminal justice system. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
171. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (“The focus, of
course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
generate.”); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2000) (“It is not the trial
court’s role to decide whether an expert’s opinion is correct. The trial court is limited to
determining whether expert testimony is pertinent to an issue in the case and whether the
methodology underlying that testimony is sound.”).
172. See Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d at 719.
173. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95. Failure to focus solely on how the expert arrived
at his or her conclusions can constitute reversible error. See, e.g., Deputy v. Lehman Bros.,
345 F.3d 494, 508 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that the district court incorrectly excluded expert
testimony for reasons relevant to valuing the testimony rather than questioning its method of
analysis).
174. See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion and
disparity in applying Daubert).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Ochoa-Ramirez, 386 F. App’x 641, 642 (9th Cir. 2010)
(admitting prejudicial evidence because it had probative value and its prejudicial effect was
mitigated by limiting jury instructions); United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.
1979) (“Relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; but it is only unfair prejudice,
substantially outweighing probative value, which permits exclusion of relevant matter under
Rule 403.”); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(describing the same).
176. Daniel J. Capra, Exclusion and Admissibility Under Rule 403, 212 N.Y. L.J. 3, 3
(1994).
177. 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
178. Id. at 1029.
179. Id. at 1049.
180. The court mitigated the prejudicial effect of the evidence by giving the jury specific
instructions not to grant the testimony more weight than was appropriate, and the court noted
that it could also restrict the degree of certainty with which the expert testifies. Id. at 1049–
50.
181. Id. at 1049 (quoting 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S
EVIDENCE § 702[03], at 702–03 (1989)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215,
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case, the probative value outweighed the potential prejudicial effect. This
reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s vote of confidence in the aptitude and
utility of the jury and in the adversarial system, 182 which the Court has
repeatedly recognized as “‘the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of the truth.’” 183 Scholars point out that while jurors may not
enter the courtroom with extensive scientific or technical knowledge, if any
at all, their collective experiences still warrant their participation in “legal
decision making,” even when the decisions are based on scientific
evidence. 184
D. Forensic Science Evidence Under Daubert
Following Daubert, scholars were both skeptical and critical of the
decision’s practical impact. 185 One major criticism was that Daubert
presumed that science operates on “objective standards that can be clearly
understood and applied by judges” when in fact those standards vary
widely. 186 Judges often evaluate scientific evidence based on their own
assumptions about the nature of the evidence, analyzing the evidence under
personalized methods and standards.187 This creates confusion and
discrepancy as “litigants with similar complaints are subjected by
gatekeeping judges to substantially different evidentiary standards and
validation processes.” 188 The forensic sciences provide a salient example
245 (3d Cir. 2004) (“‘[A] party confronted with an adverse expert witness who has
sufficient, though perhaps not overwhelming, facts and assumptions as the basis for his
opinion can highlight those weaknesses through effective cross-examination.’” (quoting
Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 2002))).
182. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
183. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 158 (1970)); see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009)
(recognizing that cross-examination is a constitutionally guaranteed method of testing the
reliability of forensic evidence).
184. Patricia M. Ayd & Merle M. Troeger, Are Jurors Smart Enough to Understand
Scientific Evidence?, in EXPERT WITNESSING: EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE 38
(Carl Meyer ed., 1999); see also Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the
Picture, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1047, 1061–64 (2003) (arguing that jurors would not be
unfairly prejudiced or misled by such evidence and should be presented with the evidence
because they still effectively serve as finders of fact).
185. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW,
SCIENCE, AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 139–43
(2007) (describing Daubert’s potential damage to the criminal justice system); Friedman,
supra note 184, at 1047 (describing how the admissibility model created by the Daubert
trilogy “is not a useful one”); Jasanoff, supra note 149, at 30–31; see also Andrew Jurs,
Judicial Analysis of Complex & Cutting-Edge Science in the Daubert Era: Epidemiologic
Risk Assessment as a Test Case for Reform Strategies, 42 CONN. L. REV. 49, 52, 69–84
(2009) (identifying multiple weaknesses displayed by courts when applying Daubert).
186. Jasanoff, supra note 149, at 44; see also id. at 45 (“[D]espite Daubert’s suggestions
to the contrary, there are no universally applicable rules for evaluating scientific validity in
all litigation contexts.”); see also Friedman, supra note 184, at 1047–48 (remarking how the
Daubert admissibility standard is both insufficient and inappropriately applied because trial
courts are ill suited to sort the good from the bad, and it misdirects the appropriate focus for
a useful evidentiary standard).
187. Jasanoff, supra note 149, at 44.
188. Id.
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of how judges apply different evidentiary standards and validation
processes.
One of the goals of Daubert was to weed out “junk science” from the
courtroom. 189 As gatekeepers, judges are supposed to ban empirically
unreliable evidence under the strictures of Daubert and Rule 702. 190 But
scholars have pointed out that judges have failed to do so, particularly in the
criminal context. 191 Studies have shown that judges are especially lax in
applying Daubert to forensic evidence proffered by prosecutors in criminal
trials. 192 A recent report notes that much of forensic evidence severely
lacks scientific validity and reliability, yet the courts have been “utterly
ineffective in addressing this problem.” 193 Although some district courts
have begun to question the scientific underpinnings of forensic science
evidence under Daubert, the trend has been slow to reach the appellate
level. 194 To understand the relevance of forensic evidence to functional
neuroimaging evidence, forensic evidence must first be understood.
189. Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 & n.6 (1997); see also Amorgianos v.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The flexible Daubert inquiry
. . . [helps] ensure that the courtroom door remains closed to junk science while admitting
reliable expert testimony that will assist the trier of fact.”).
190. See supra notes 126–31 and accompanying text (summarizing the judge’s
gatekeeping role).
191. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 1071, 1072, 1073 n.12 (noting the difference in admissibility standards
between civil and criminal cases and how experts offered by the prosecution have been
“largely insulated from any change in pre-Daubert standards”); see also Jane Campbell
Moriarty, Daubert, Innocence, and the Future of Forensic Science, 43 TULSA L. REV. 229,
229–30 (2007) (listing scholars who discuss how judges have been lax in their gatekeeping
role).
192. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1:35 (2009–2010 ed.); NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 11
(“[T]he vast majority of the reported opinions in criminal cases indicate that trial judges
rarely exclude or restrict expert testimony offered by prosecutors; most reported opinions
also indicate that appellate courts routinely deny appeals contesting trial court decisions
admitting forensic evidence against criminal defendants.”); see also Giannelli, supra note
191, at 1111.
193. NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 53. Despite the fact that these problems were first
acknowledged almost twenty years ago, little has been done to change the frequency of their
courtroom use. See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA “Fingerprinting”
Can Teach the Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 372
(1991) (noting that forensic scientists need to “subject their claims to methodologically
rigorous empirical tests” that should then be “published and debated,” but until such steps
are taken, their claims should be “regarded with far more caution than they traditionally have
been”); cf. infra notes 224–25 and accompanying text (citing cases where forensic science
continues to be used in the courtroom without much attention paid to scientific reliability).
194. See, e.g., Ege v. Yukins, 380 F. Supp. 2d 852, 871 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (finding
bitemark evidence “unreliable and not worthy of consideration by a jury”), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 485 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hidalgo, 229
F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 (D. Ariz. 2002) (finding that handwriting analysis fails to pass
Daubert); United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558, 576 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(excluding and then admitting fingerprint evidence, finding it sufficiently reliable under
Daubert only when subject to “careful trial court oversight”); United States v. Saelee, 162
F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1103, 1105–06 (D. Alaska 2001) (finding that handwriting analysis fails to
pass Daubert); see also Deputy v. Lehman Bros., 345 F.3d 494, 509 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting
disparity in admissibility of handwriting analysis between circuit courts and district courts).

2011]

A CASE FOR FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING

377

Because functional neuroimaging has great potential for the criminal
justice system, and particularly for defendants,195 the next section of this
Note discusses how Daubert affected one of the most important aspects of
criminal evidence: forensic science evidence, and in particular, forensic
individualization evidence.
1. Forensic Individualization as Scientific Evidence
Forensic science evidence has three main purposes: identification,
individualization, and reconstruction. 196
The purpose of forensic
identification is to identify a substance and quantify or measure it.197 For
example, a police officer might send a bag of white powder confiscated
during an arrest to a forensics lab to determine whether it contains cocaine
and if so, how much. 198 Classic forensic sciences such as this are
considered highly reliable 199 and are rarely challenged under Daubert or
Rule 702 unless there is evidence of negligence or fraud. 200
Forensic individualization has an entirely different goal. Instead of
identifying or quantifying a particular substance based on inherent or
objective characteristics, forensic individualization relies on the “expert
interpretation of observed patterns” 201 in order to “associate an item of
evidence found at a crime scene with its unique source, to the exclusion of
all others.” 202 Forensic individualization experts rely on principles of basic
probability, which state that the likelihood that a unique trait is shared by
two different objects is extremely small. 203 Thus, by analyzing the
“uniqueness” of an object and comparing it to known samples of the same
or similar objects, forensic individualization experts claim to identify the
source of the object. 204 This type of analysis makes exclusion easier than
association, meaning that it is much easier for an expert to rule out a
possible source for the specific object than to definitively “match” it to a
source. 205 In fact, “[t]he claim of unique individualization has never been
demonstrated for any forensic individualization science through empirical
195. See supra notes 106–15 and accompanying text.
196. Moriarty & Saks, supra note 17, at 17. This Note focuses on forensic
individualization and compares it to functional brain scans.
197. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 30:19; Moriarty & Saks, supra note 17, at 17.
198. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530–31 (2009)
(describing forensic identification of cocaine); United States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 617 F.3d
581, 599, 607 (1st Cir. 2010) (reviewing forensic analyst’s description of crack cocaine),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 968 (2011).
199. NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 135; Moriarty & Saks, supra note 17, at 17.
200. Moriarty & Saks, supra note 17, at 17. As a recent student note points out, “[t]he
American criminal justice system is no stranger to forensic falsification.” Kristen Bolden,
Note, DNA Fabrication, A Wake Up Call: The Need to Reevaluate the Admissibility and
Reliability of DNA Evidence, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 409, 417 (2011).
201. NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 7.
202. Moriarty & Saks, supra note 17, at 17; see also FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192,
§ 30:19.
203. Moriarty & Saks, supra note 17, at 18.
204. Id. Forensic individualization experts use similar methods to identify a specific
subpopulation of people who share the unique trait. Id.
205. Id. at 18–19.
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testing.” 206 Yet, as scholars point out, this has not prevented some forensic
experts from claiming that they can definitively match an item to its
source. 207
For example, in United States v. Green, 208 prosecutors sought to call a
ballistics expert to testify that fourteen shell casings found on a street were
all fired from the same weapon.209 The expert claimed to be able to match
the shell casings to a specific firearm “to the exclusion of every other
firearm in the world.” 210 Recognizing the “sloppy practices”211 and
“serious deficiencies” 212 of the forensic technique, the court nevertheless
allowed the expert to testify but prohibited him from testifying that he could
identify the gun to the exclusion of all other firearms. 213
Often called “non-science forensic sciences,” forensic individualization
sciences include what could be considered a typical lineup of forensic
evidence: analyses of fingerprints, shoe prints, bite marks, tool marks,
firearms (ballistics), handwriting, hair samples, and DNA, among others.214
Though they are not based on typical scientific methods of analysis, with
the exception of forensic DNA analysis, 215 forensic individualization
206. Michael J. Saks, Explaining the Tension Between the Supreme Court’s Embrace of
Validity as the Touchstone of Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Lower Court’s
(Seeming) Rejection of Same, 5 EPISTEME 329, 331 (2008).
207. See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 141–43 (stating that fingerprint experts
often testify in objective terms such as “absolute certainty” or “zero error rates,” assertions
that are “not scientifically plausible” and “[c]learly . . . unrealistic”); Moriarty & Saks, supra
note 17, at 20 (describing same); see also Duncan v. Ornoski, 528 F.3d 1222, 1237 (9th Cir.
2008) (recounting fingerprint expert’s testimony and court’s reliance thereon that
fingerprints “can be ascribed to a specific individual with certainty”), aff’d, 286 F. App’x
361 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hall, 905 F.2d 959, 963 (6th Cir. 1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (quoting handwriting expert’s testimony that was “‘virtually certain that [the
defendant] wrote it’”); United States v. Hugh, No. 03-829, 2009 WL 212420, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 28, 2009) (mentioning a fingerprint expert’s claim of an “exact match”); United States
v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005) (describing officer’s testimony that he
could match shell casings to the weapon from which it was fired “to the exclusion of every
other firearm in the world”); United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind.
2000) (“The government claims the error rate for the [fingerprint] method is zero.”), aff’d,
260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001). However, some forensic experts do testify to a “reasonable
degree” of scientific or technical certainty. See, e.g., Norwood v. Artis, 487 F. Supp. 2d 321,
326 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).
208. 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 109.
212. Id. at 108.
213. Id. at 124. While the ballistics expert was allowed to testify, Judge Nancy Gertner’s
ruling is significant because it is one of the few instances where a court recognized the
failings associated with forensic science and took corrective measures. See infra note 274
(citing other cases that took similar measures).
214. Moriarty & Saks, supra note 17, at 18; Saks, supra note 206, at 329–30.
215. Saks, supra note 206, at 330. Even DNA analysis, the “gold standard” of modern
forensic evidence, is not without its own analytical deficiencies. A recent study has shown
that even DNA samples can be fabricated and more rigorous verification methods are
necessary. See Dan Frumkin et al., Authentication of Forensic DNA Samples, 4 FORENSIC
SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 95 (2010); see also NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 130–33. See
generally Natasha Gilbert, DNA’s Identity Crisis, 464 NATURE 347 (2010) (questioning the
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sciences still rely on expert testimony, and are therefore subject to Daubert
and Rule 702. 216
It is widely recognized that forensic individualization has little or no
scientific, empirical, or testable foundation,217 and there have been few if
any attempts to improve them with serious research. 218 Although many
forensic individualization techniques have been around for a long time,219
they must still meet the Daubert standards; Daubert carries no
“grandfather” clause that would allow the evidence to bypass the
admissibility standards. 220 Moreover, the evaluation of the forensic
individualization sciences is especially important in criminal Daubert

reliability of DNA evidence from ever-smaller human traces); Bolden, supra note 200
(describing deficiencies in DNA analysis and the need to reevaluate its use in court).
216. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 30:2; Moriarty & Saks, supra note 17, at 17;
supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text. Forensic individualization sciences would also
be subject to Rules 403, 704, and others.
217. See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 14–18; Craig M. Cooley & Gabriel S.
Oberfield, Increasing Forensic Evidence’s Reliability and Minimizing Wrongful
Convictions: Applying Daubert Isn’t the Only Problem, 43 TULSA L. REV. 285, 292–94
(2007); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic
Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 203–07 (2008). See generally Mara L. Merlino et
al., Meeting the Challenges of the Daubert Trilogy: Refining and Redefining the Reliability
of Forensic Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 417 (2007); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Of Black Boxes,
Instruments, and Experts: Testing the Validity of Forensic Science, 5 EPISTEME 343 (2008);
Moriarty & Saks, supra note 17; D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a
Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137
U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989); Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic
Science (Especially Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167 (2003);
Adina Schwartz, Firearms and Toolmark Identification Cannot Be Made to a Reasonable
Degree of Certainty, CHAMPION MAG., Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 44.
218. See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 108–09 (“‘[T]he undeniable reality is that
the community of forensic science professionals has not done nearly as much as it
reasonably could have done to establish either the validity of its approach or the accuracy of
its practitioners’ conclusions,’ and the courts have been ‘utterly ineffective’ in addressing
this problem.” (quoting Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint
Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 127,
139 (2008)); see also Saks, supra note 206, at 329, 330–31 (“‘[In] [a]ll the areas of forensic
[identification] science . . . little rigorous, systematic research has been done to validate the
discipline’s basic premises and techniques, and in each area there is no evident reason why
such research would be infeasible.’” (quoting Paul Giannelli & Edward Imwinkelried,
Scientific Evidence: The Fallout from Supreme Court’s Decision in Kumho Tires, 14 CRIM.
JUST. 12, 40 (2000))).
219. For example, fingerprint evidence was first admitted in an American appellate
proceeding in 1911. See People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077, 1082 (Ill. 1911); FAIGMAN ET AL.,
supra note 192, § 33:2 n.9. Forensic handwriting identification has been used in litigation
since at least 1832, but the first empirical study to examine handwriting identification was
conducted in 1939. See Strother v. Lucas, 31 U.S. 763, 767 (1832); Risinger et al., supra
note 217, at 734 n.14, 740–43.
220. See United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 162 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[E]xpert
testimony long assumed reliable before Rule 702 must nonetheless be subject to the careful
examination that Daubert and Kumho Tire require.”); see also Richard Bjur & James T.
Richardson, Expert Testimony Involving Chemists and Chemistry, in EXPERT WITNESSING:
EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE, supra note 184, at 67, 75; Beecher-Monas &
Garcia-Rill, supra note 106, at 275 (“Lower courts cannot blindly accept pre-Daubert
approved notions of expertise.”); Gianelli, supra note 191, at 1096–99.
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jurisprudence. 221 The Daubert standard may have been framed in a civil
case initially, yet “federal courts should apply [it] with equal force to their
criminal docket.” 222
Scholars widely agree that rigorous application of the Daubert standard
is severely lacking. 223 Most forensic techniques remain largely untested
and their validity under Daubert is questionable at best. Yet they are
continually admitted, often based on their long history of judicial
acceptance 224 and sometimes by judicial notice.225 The need for genuine
evidentiary analysis grows stronger as an increasing number of convictions,
which relied heavily on forensic individualization evidence, are overturned
by DNA exonerations. 226 According to Professor David Faigman, “faulty
forensic science is second only to eyewitness errors as the leading cause of
erroneous convictions.” 227
For example, in 1998, Stephan Cowans was convicted of shooting a
Boston police officer. 228 A key item of incriminating evidence offered at
trial was a latent fingerprint found at the scene of the shooting. 229 Two
separate fingerprint analysts confirmed the match, but the evidence was

221. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 1:35 (“[T]he vitality of Daubert itself might be
assessed on whether the courts embrace the gatekeeping function seriously enough to
challenge forensic scientists to live up to the title ‘scientist.’”).
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., id. § 1:30 (noting “courts’ general abdication of any serious critical review
of the non-DNA forensic identification sciences.”); Giannelli, supra note 191, at 1111
(“Paradoxically, and perhaps shamefully, [Daubert] has not been consistently imposed in
criminal cases.”).
224. NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 106–09; see, e.g., United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d
105, 110 (1st Cir. 2009) (admitting fingerprint evidence despite the court’s reservations
about its reliability because “the case law is overwhelmingly in favor of admitting
fingerprint experts under virtually any circumstance”); United States v. Prime, 431 F.3d
1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005) (same for handwriting identification); United States v. Crisp, 324
F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2003) (same); FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 33:3 (describing
how judges are convinced of the reliability of fingerprint analysis and avoid conducting a
Daubert analysis); see also D. Michael Risinger, Cases Involving the Reliability of
Handwriting Identification Expertise Since the Decision in Daubert, 43 TULSA L. REV. 477,
561 (2007) (noting that cases are decided by “authority and case citations,” often foregoing
the proper admissibility analyses and instead admitting evidence by stare decisis).
225. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 689–90 (8th Cir. 2004) (suggesting
that fingerprint evidence can be admitted by judicial notice); Brooks v. State, 748 So. 2d
736, 746–47 (Miss. 1999) (Smith, J., concurring) (citing numerous cases where the court
took judicial notice of forensic odontology—expert analysis of bite marks—without
conducting any evidentiary hearing under either Frye or Daubert).
226. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 1:35. As of February 1, 2009, the Innocence
Project has found that “[o]f the first 225 wrongful convictions overturned by DNA testing,
more than 50% (116 cases) involved unvalidated or improper forensic science.” See
Wrongful Convictions Involving Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science that Were Later
Overturned
Through
DNA
Testing,
THE
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/DNA_Exonerations_Forensic_Science.pdf.
227. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 1:35.
228. Cowans v. City of Boston, No. 05-CV-11574, 2007 WL 28419, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan.
4, 2007).
229. Id.
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never challenged under Daubert. 230 Six years later, DNA test results
showed that the prints were wholly inconsistent with Cowans’ DNA
profile. 231 The fingerprints were reanalyzed and the initial conclusions
were found to be not only erroneous, but it was discovered that the
conclusions were known to be erroneous during Cowans’ trial and during
his conviction, though that information was intentionally concealed.232
While the unfortunate experience of Stephan Cowans is an extreme
example of prosecutorial misconduct, it highlights the importance of
conducting a Daubert analysis for forensic individualization evidence, and
the severe consequences that might accompany a failure to do so. A recent
governmental report sums up this point: “[B]ecause accused parties in
criminal cases are convicted on the basis of testimony from forensic science
experts, much depends upon whether the evidence offered is reliable.” 233
2. Evidentiary Challenges Post-Daubert
The rate of pretrial challenges to forensic evidence admissibility has
generally increased post-Daubert, but most of these challenges occur in
civil suits. 234 In criminal trials, prosecutors introduce far more forensic
evidence than do defendants, and prosecutors also challenge the
admissibility of forensic evidence approximately three-and-a-half times
more often than defendants. 235
The success rate of admissibility challenges to forensic evidence in
criminal prosecutions mirrors the disparity with which they are brought.
Defendant-initiated Daubert challenges succeed less than 10 percent of the
time. 236 Challenges by prosecutors, in contrast, succeed more than twothirds of the time. 237 Although this does not necessarily reflect an inherent
unfairness in the judicial system or call into question the wisdom of any
230. Id.; Brief for the Innocence Project, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (No. 04-1327), 2005 WL 879501, at *13–14
[hereinafter Innocence Project Brief]; Jonathan Saltzman & Mac Daniel, Man Freed in 1997
Shooting of Officer: Judge Gives Ruling After Fingerprint Revelation, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 24,
2004, at A1.
231. Innocence Project Brief, supra note 230, at *14.
232. Cowans, 2007 WL 28419, at *1; Innocence Project Brief, supra note 230, at *13–14.
233. See NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 109.
234. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 1:35.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.; see Cooley & Oberfield, supra note 217, at 285, 291 (finding that the
prosecution’s success rate is much higher). The disparity is emphasized when compared
with Daubert challenges to forensic evidence in civil trials. In federal civil trials, forensic
evidence was excluded under Daubert 41 percent of the time, compared with 25 percent of
the time pre-Daubert. Challenges made by defendants succeed approximately two-thirds of
the time, compared with a success rate of less than half for challenges posed by plaintiffs.
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 1:35; see also Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been
Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in
Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 906–07 & 907 n.139 (2009). These
statistics underscore the observation that “courts have been, at best, lackadaisical and, at
worst, disingenuous in carrying out their gatekeeping duties toward forensic science [in
criminal cases].” See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 1:30.
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specific court decision, it has raised eyebrows within the scholarly
community. 238
3. 2009 National Research Council Report
The limitations of the forensic individualization sciences have not gone
unnoticed. Recognizing a dire need for improvement, Congress passed the
Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act of 2006. 239 Given the significant “absence of data” within the forensic
science and legal communities, the statute authorized the National Academy
of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a comprehensive study on the forensic
sciences and to suggest improvements and guidelines to “help ensure
quality and consistency in the use of forensic technologies.” 240
In its report, the National Research Council (NRC), an arm of the NAS,
identified numerous weaknesses plaguing the forensic sciences, of which
the most prevalent weaknesses were among forensic individualization
sciences. 241 The weaknesses identified by the committee include disparity
in operation, inconsistent practices, lack of standardization, absence of
The
certification and accreditation, and interpretive problems. 242
committee also noted that, except for DNA analysis, no forensic technique
has rigorously drawn a consistent and reliable connection between forensic
evidence and a specific individual or source.243
The committee found that no standardization or regulation exists either
across the forensic individualization disciplines or within a particular
discipline. 244 The committee further noted that forensics are most often
based on subjective interpretations of observed characteristics rather than
scientific studies to determine their validity, and that this is “a serious
problem.” 245 Accordingly, the committee declared that “research is
required to establish the limits and measures of performance” of the
individualization sciences. 246 Given that the legal and judicial communities
rely so heavily on forensics, the committee lamented that “the law’s greatest
dilemma . . . [is] whether—and to what extent—there is science in any
given forensic science discipline.” 247 The committee made multiple
recommendations to improve forensic science evidence in courtrooms, but
its initial and primary recommendation was that Congress should
238. See, e.g., FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 1:35 (offering possible explanations for
this disparity); Perlin, supra note 237, at 906–07; Saks, supra note 206, at 335–41
(explaining why courts accept forensic evidence despite its lack of validity).
239. Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
240. S. REP. NO. 109-88, at 46 (2005).
241. See NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 6.
242. Id. at 5–8.
243. See id. at 7; supra note 206 and accompanying text. But see supra note 215 (noting
deficiencies in DNA analysis).
244. NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 7.
245. Id. at 8.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 9.
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appropriate funds to establish an independent federal entity to supervise,
promote, and develop the forensic disciplines into a mature and reliable
field of research and practice. 248
4. Forensic Individualization in the Courtroom
Various courts, including the Supreme Court,249 have admitted forensic
individualization evidence despite recognizing that it has significant
weaknesses. 250 While some courts appear to conduct a Daubert analysis,
they overlook scientific issues and admit the evidence on non-scientific
grounds, often yielding to its history of past admissibility. 251 For example,
in United States v. Crisp, 252 the Fourth Circuit found that both fingerprint
identification and handwriting comparison survive Daubert. 253 Although
the court appeared to conduct a Daubert analysis, 254 it explicitly stated its
reason for admitting the testimony:
“[L]ike fingerprint analysis,
handwriting comparison testimony has a long history of admissibility in the
courts of this country. The fact that handwriting comparison analysis has
achieved widespread and lasting acceptance in the expert community gives
us the assurance of reliability that Daubert requires.” 255 The court
recognized the scientific shortcomings of the evidence 256 and noted that a
few district courts had recently questioned its viability under Daubert.257

248. Id. at 81–82.
249. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009) (noting that
although there are “[s]erious deficiencies” in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials,
confrontation and the adversarial process can weed them out).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting
serious criticisms of lead bullet forensic analysis are “no more than impeaching evidence”);
United States v. Ford, 481 F.3d 215, 218 n.5 (3d Cir. 2007) (admitting forensic
individualization evidence but noting that Daubert “might be a fruitless exercise” due to
“some of the difficulties inherent in this type of science”); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d
261, 270 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that while additional research “would be welcome,” it
would be foolish to exclude the evidence); United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 536,
568 (D. Md. 2010) (finding that although forensic toolmark analysis may not be “sufficiently
reliable to be called a ‘science,’” it is consistently admitted and may still be useful to the
jury); see also FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 1:30 (“Although the scholarly literature is
increasingly demonstrating the paucity of data underlying many forensic fields, courts
blithely ignore the empirical realities.”).
251. See, e.g., United States v. Prime, 431 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
district court’s finding that handwriting testimony was admissible “was consistent with all
six circuits that have addressed [its] admissibility”); United States v. Rogers, 26 F. App’x
171, 173 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[V]irtually every circuit and district court, both before and after
Daubert, [has] a longstanding tradition of allowing fingerprint examiners to state their
opinion and conclusions.”).
252. 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003).
253. Id. at 271.
254. Id. at 265–68.
255. Id. at 271 (citation omitted). But see id. at 272 (Michael, J., dissenting) (describing
how a long history of admissibility should not grant the government a “pass” to show how
the evidence satisfies Daubert).
256. Id. at 270 (“[F]urther research into fingerprint analysis would be welcome.”).
257. Id. at 270 n.5.
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Yet in what one scholar calls a “breathtaking[] disregard of Daubert,”258
the court nevertheless was unwilling to depart from the pedigree of the
evidence. 259 As some scholars note, the court blindly accepted the validity
of the evidence, stating that its error rate was “negligible” or “essentially
zero,” 260 a statement that is “startling” when given without supporting
data. 261
Similarly, in Green, Judge Nancy Gertner strongly implied that expert
toolmark testimony 262 should properly be excluded under Daubert,263 but
that she felt “compelled to allow” it because she was “confiden[t] that any
other decision will be rejected by appellate courts, in light of precedents
across the country” that consistently admit it.264 Judge Gertner expressed
her frustration with the testimony’s continued admission despite its obvious
Daubert insufficiencies, lamenting: “The more courts admit this type of
toolmark evidence without requiring documentation, proficiency testing, or
evidence of reliability, the more sloppy practices will endure; we should
require more.” 265
A recent district court opinion struck a different chord. In United States
v. Willock, 266 Judge William D. Quarles, Jr. adopted the report and
recommendation of Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm, who conducted an
extensive Daubert review of ballistics identification. 267 Noting that the
validity of the science “has not yet been fully demonstrated,” Judge Grimm
found that the expert’s testimony still had a “baseline level of credibility”
useful to the jury 268 and should be admitted under Daubert, but with strict
qualifications. 269 The court allowed the expert to testify in uncertain
terms—using the qualifying phrase, “more likely than not” 270—and
mandated that the testimony was to be considered an “estimate” supported
by the evidence, which would go to the weight of the testimony. 271 The
jury would reach the ultimate question of whether the bullets were fired
258. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 34:7 (referring to the court’s decision to admit
the evidence as adopting the “guild test,” meaning that courts defer to the history of the
evidence’s use in court); see NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 110 (noting that judges could
be reluctant to conduct proper Daubert analyses due to history of admissibility); see also
United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that fingerprint
evidence survives Daubert, largely due to its history of admissibility).
259. Id. at 270 (“[L]ike fingerprint analysis, handwriting comparison testimony has a long
history of admissibility in the courts of this country.”).
260. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 34:7 (citing Crisp, 324 F.3d at 269).
261. See id. § 33:18; see also NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 142 (“[C]laims . . . [of]
zero error rates are not scientifically plausible.”).
262. Toolmarks are generated when a hard object comes into contact with a relatively
softer object, leaving an indentation or marking which experts can trace to an individual tool.
See NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 150.
263. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2005).
264. Id. at 108–09.
265. Id. at 109.
266. 696 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2010).
267. Id. at 549–74.
268. Id. at 570.
269. Id. at 547 nn.25–26.
270. Id. at 574.
271. Id.
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from the specific firearm. 272 Responding to concerns about the unreliability
of the testimony or its potential to mislead the jury, Judge Quarles said
those weaknesses would emerge “through effective cross-examination, or
by offering defense experts to challenge [them].” 273
With the exception of some recent district court decisions, 274 most courts
do not question forensic individualization evidence under Daubert, and
some argue that to do so would “make the best the enemy of the good.” 275
Some commentators agree, suggesting that unreliable forensic evidence is
admitted because to “demand more by way of validation [is more] than the
disciplines can presently offer.” 276 Others voice their disagreement by
suggesting that forensic evidence is admitted under a misguided
understanding of the Daubert “reliability” requirement as expressed in Rule
702. 277 As will be discussed in Part III.A, the fact that individualization
evidence is routinely admitted under Daubert without subjecting it to a
proper admissibility analysis should force judges to carefully consider
admitting functional neuroimaging evidence.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING
This part discusses the arguments for and against admitting functional
brain scans as evidence in the courtroom. This Note avoids potential
constitutional issues posed by such evidence 278 and focuses instead on
federal criminal cases in which such evidence is used, admissibility issues
raised under the federal evidence admissibility standards, and implications
of such evidence for the criminal justice system at the federal level.
While courts are quick to admit neuroscience evidence, 279 courts have
been more circumspect about admitting functional neuroimaging
272. See id. at 573–74.
273. Id. at 578.
274. See, e.g., Deputy v. Lehman Bros., 345 F.3d 494, 509 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing several
district courts that have rejected handwriting analysis for lack of scientific reliability);
United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009) (finding ballistics was
not a science but admitting the testimony with similar qualifications); United States v.
Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (same); see also supra note 194.
275. United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Crisp,
324 F.3d 261, 270 (4th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 2d 262,
267 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 2002); United States v. Llera-Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 572 (E.D. Pa.
2002).
276. NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 109 (citing Crisp, 324 F.3d at 270); Joan Griffin &
David J. LaMagna, Daubert Challenges to Forensic Evidence: Ballistics Next on the Firing
Line, CHAMPION MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 20.
277. See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON
HALL L. REV. 191, 193–219 (2003) (discussing general reliability standard and how it has
been misapplied).
278. For example, constitutional issues are raised if scans are used as lie detection
devices. See, e.g., John G. New, If You Could Read My Mind: Implications of Neurological
Evidence for Twenty-First Century Criminal Jurisprudence, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 179, 193–98
(discussing Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns raised by neurologically-based lie
detection devices). See generally Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 115 (discussing Fourth and
Fifth Amendment implications).
279. See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 71, at 31 (noting that structural brain scans “are
routinely introduced in court to show brain injuries, tumors, and abnormalities”); Patel et al.,
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evidence. 280 Functional neuroimaging is “too new, too uncertain, and too
laden with troubling questions to earn easy admission to the courts.”281
Further, most of the criminal cases in which functional neuroimaging
evidence is admitted are state cases, not federal, though it has been admitted
in civil litigation at both the state and federal level.282
A. Arguments for Excluding Functional Neuroimaging Evidence
1. Lack of Methodological and Interpretive Standardization
Critics question the validity and reliability of the underlying science of
functional neuroimaging, 283 and often refer to an analytical or deductive
gap between the imaging studies and the courtroom testimony. 284 As noted
earlier, neuroimaging techniques have either a temporal delay or imperfect
spatial resolution, or a combination of both. 285 Critics argue that courtroom
use is premature because the scans necessarily involve expert
interpretations, 286 which depend heavily on the methods employed by the
individual scientists and researchers conducting the scans. 287 Individual
assumptions, they argue, can influence the results of a scan because
numerous choices and considerations contribute to determining how the
scans will be conducted, what data will be collected, and how that data will
be analyzed. 288 As the studies get more complex, so does the data, which
in turn increases the subjectivity and disparity in interpreting the results.289
With little standardization among neuroimaging techniques, it is difficult to
compare objectively the results of a scan conducted by one researcher with
those of another scan conducted by a different researcher.290
supra note 33, at 557–58 (noting that brain imaging is used “[i]n courthouses across the
United States”).
280. See Moriarty, supra note 71, at 29, 32, 48 (noting that few courts have admitted
fMRI-based evidence). While Yang and colleagues state that approximately 130 cases have
utilized PET or SPECT scans, they do not break down the distribution of cases into state and
federal, or civil and criminal. See Yang et al., supra note 48, at 77–78.
281. Moriarty, supra note 71, at 48.
282. See Patel et al., supra note 33, at 561–64 (describing the types of cases in which
functional neuroimaging evidence has been admitted).
283. See, e.g., Jay D. Aronson, The Law’s Use of Brain Evidence, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC.
SCI. 93, 100–01 (2010); Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 22, at 171–72; Jennifer
Kulynych, Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 1249, 1259 (1997).
284. See, e.g., Kulynych, supra note 283, at 1259.
285. See supra notes 61, 70–71, 77–79, 89–91 and accompanying text (describing various
neuroimaging techniques and their corresponding temporal and/or spatial resolution).
286. Kulynych, supra note 283, at 1259; See Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1149–
52 (discussing the problems of individual differences as they pertain to fMRI lie detection);
Greely, supra note 6, at 711–14; Reeves et al., supra note 63, at 90.
287. Baskin et al., supra note 45, at 249; Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1142–43.
288. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1143–49, 1152–55; Feigenson, supra note
89, at 32; Greely & Illes, supra note 90, at 383–84; Jones et al., supra note 62, ¶ 32.
289. Baskin et al., supra note 45, at 249; Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1144–49.
290. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1143, 1152–55 (discussing variables in
methods used); Snead, supra note 45, at 1288–89; see also Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d
1148, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding district court’s exclusion of defendant’s PET scan in
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Critics also argue that individual differences among subjects are
important in law, and functional neuroimaging insufficiently accounts for
them. 291 Thresholds demarcating statistically significant brain activity292
are not standardized, so deviation from arbitrarily established norms may
not reliably indicate whether a subject has normal or dysfunctional brain
activity. 293 As one scholar noted, “Anyone dealing with the application of
neuroscience to law has to remember that most studies are about group
averages, but there is no ‘group’ in the witness box or the defendant’s seat.
Moving from the group average to the individual will be very hard.” 294 The
brain is a composite of influences incorporating numerous social, cultural,
and personal experiences.295 When introduced in legal settings such as
courtrooms, these individual characteristics and unique qualities are
prioritized and they become exceedingly important, so even the slightest
nuances in brain function are highly relevant. 296 Basing comparisons and
results on arbitrarily established “normal” levels as is the case with
functional neuroimaging is therefore unhelpful. 297
2. Complexity and Interconnectedness of the Brain
Furthermore, critics oppose functional neuroimaging evidence because
even if scans can accurately detect specific patterns of brain activity in
individuals, the brain is too complex to localize behavior to a specific brain
region. 298 Moreover, critics argue that scientists can only draw correlations
between brain function and human behavior; direct causation cannot be
traced. 299 With the interconnectedness between brain regions and brain

part because it “is susceptible to conflicting interpretations”), aff’d after new sentencing
hearing sub nom. People v. Jackson, 199 P.3d 1098 (Cal. 2009).
291. Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1150–52; Greely, supra note 6, at 713–14.
292. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text (discussing how functional
neuroimaging relies on comparisons based on comparing a subject’s brain activity with
previously collected “normal” activity).
293. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1150 (noting the importance of individual
differences and their ability to skew results); Greely, supra note 6, at 714; Greely & Illes,
supra note 90, at 380–81 (describing numerous reasons why deviations in results may
occur).
294. Greely, supra note 6, at 714; see also Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1150–52.
295. See Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 57, at 66.
296. See Greely, supra note 6, at 713–14 (describing how variations occur across
individuals, and “as the law mainly cares about individuals, this is a real challenge”).
297. See id.; see also Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1150–52 (noting the
importance of individual differences).
298. See Steven K. Erickson, Blaming the Brain, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 27, 32
(2010) (“Brain activity is a global phenomenon, not merely a localized one within
compartments of the brain . . . .”); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique
of Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 219–26 (2009) (describing
the difficulty of localizing behavior to specific brain regions); Snead, supra note 45, at
1287–88 & 1287 n.110 (same).
299. Baskin et al., supra note 45, at 249; Jones et al., supra note 62, ¶ 38; Snead, supra
note 45, at 1287.
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function insufficiently understood, the risk of error in reaching legal
conclusions based on inferences about brain function is high. 300
3. Minimal Probative Value
Even if functional brain scans can accurately associate brain function
with activity in a specific area of the brain, critics are not convinced that
such findings would have probative value to “assist” the fact-finder as Rule
702 requires. 301 As Professor Michael Gazzaniga argues, law is concerned
with individual actions and responsibility, a social-legal construct that
“does not exist in the neuronal structures of the brain.”302 Functional
neuroimaging is therefore unhelpful unless it can provide “actual proof that
the defendant is unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts.” 303 Compounding this difficulty, current
neuroimaging techniques measure brain activity indirectly, either by blood
flow, metabolic activity, or electrical signals, and are thus “necessarily
attenuated from the ultimate object of interest—namely, cognitive
function.” 304 Critics therefore oppose admitting functional neuroevidence
about a defendant’s inability to have formed the requisite intent to commit a
crime. 305

300. Aronson, supra note 283, at 94 (“We simply do not yet have the technology or the
understanding to link the brain structure and activity to behavior in any legally meaningful
way.”); Snead, supra note 45, at 1288.
301. See, e.g., Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 57, at 72; see also FED. R. EVID. 702;
Johnson, supra note 55, at 30–32; Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and
Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 406 (2006) (arguing
that the criteria for criminal responsibility are normative and neuroscience is unhelpful to the
jury); Walter Sinnott-Armstrong et al., Brain Images as Legal Evidence, 5 EPISTEME 359,
362–67 (2008).
302. GAZZANIGA, supra note 55, at 102; see also Morse, supra note 301, at 400.
303. Moriarty, supra note 71, at 42. Many scholars debate this issue at length, and legalphilosophical implications about free will and determinism abound. See, e.g., GAZZANIGA,
supra note 55, at 87–102; Lisa Claydon, Mind the Gap: Problems of Mind, Body and Brain
in the Criminal Law, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN, supra note 57, at 55, 55–80; Michael S.
Gazzaniga & Megan S. Steven, Free Will in the Twenty-first Century: A Discussion of
Neuroscience and the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 113, at 51, 51–70;
Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN, supra note
57, at 5, 5–22; Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND
THE LAW, supra note 113, at 157, 157–98. Professor Stephen Morse has coined this the
“psycholegal error,” which is the tendency to think that an actor is not responsible for his
actions due to his genes or his brain function. Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Responsibility and
the Disappearing Person, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2545, 2569 (2007). But see Joshua Greene &
Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, in LAW &
THE BRAIN, supra note 40, at 207 (offering a counterargument that although neuroscience
may not challenge the law’s stated assumptions, it likely will change the way we think about
criminal responsibility).
304. Snead, supra note 45, at 1288.
305. See, e.g., Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1131–32, 1187–88 (arguing that
current functional neuroimaging technologies are unable to draw a meaningful conclusion
about past mental states); Snead, supra note 45, at 1287 & n.110; Kulynych, supra note 283,
at 1259.
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4. Potential to Mislead and Confuse the Jury
Finally, critics argue that functional neuroimaging should be excluded
under Rule 403 306 because it can mislead the jury. 307 Even if the actual
images are not admitted as evidence, there is concern that any neurosciencebased evidence—either the scans themselves or the expert testimony
interpreting those scans—will unduly prejudice or mislead the jury. 308 If
the actual scans are presented to a jury, critics fear a “Christmas tree
effect,” whereby jurors may be so impressed by the visual display of a
colorful brain scan that they accept the scan as authoritative evidence
without considering the merits of the expert’s accompanying testimony.309
Moreover, jurors might confuse differences in degree for differences in
kind, mistaking delicate, nuanced changes in brain activity for a simplified
dichotomy indicating that brain activity is present or absent.310 In other
words, a jury might think that a scan irrefutably supports the expert’s
testimony about a defendant’s mental state when in fact it might only
suggest the increased likelihood that a defendant either possessed a
particular mental state, or that a defendant might not be capable of
possessing a particular mental state. 311
5. Criminal Cases in Which Federal Courts Excluded Functional
Neuroimaging Evidence
It is difficult to accurately assess how functional neuroimaging is used in
federal litigation because most cases never reach trial, fewer complete a
trial, and even fewer are reported.312 Of those that are reported, only a
fraction conduct or record evidentiary hearings. 313 Of the few federal
306. See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 403).
307. See, e.g., Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1188–1202; Khoshbin & Khoshbin,
supra note 22, at 171, 185; Perlin, supra note 237, at 891–92; Reeves et al., supra note 63, at
89; Shafi, supra note 72, at 30; Kulynych, supra note 283, at 1262.
308. See Sinnott-Armstrong et al., supra note 301, at 368–69 (discussing concerns of
“neurobabble”); Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience
Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470, 476–77 (2008) (finding that evidence
supported by neuroscience explanations is more convincing to the lay person than the same
evidence without neuroscience explanation).
309. Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1190–91; Goodenough & Tucker, supra note
57, at 72.
310. See Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 57, at 72; see also Snead, supra note 45, at
1289–90.
311. See Eric Bailey, Defense Probing Brain to Explain Yosemite Killings, L.A. TIMES,
June 15, 2000, at A3 (“Jurors can be dazzled by the display. Christopher Plourd, a San
Diego criminal defense attorney, remembers well the first time he used PET scans in the
early 1990s during a murder trial. ‘Here was this nice color image we could enlarge, that the
medical expert could point to,’ Plourd said. ‘It documented that this guy had a rotten spot in
his brain. The jury glommed onto that.’”).
312. Snead, supra note 45, at 1291.
313. See United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Puerto, No. 07-14097, 2010 WL 3191765 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2010); Jackson v. Calderon,
211 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d after new sentencing hearing sub nom. People v.
Jackson, 199 P.3d 1098 (Cal. 2009); United States v. Mezvinsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d 661 (E.D.
Pa. 2002); United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 166 F.3d 75
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criminal cases that have conducted Daubert analyses, most have excluded
functional neuroimaging evidence and its corresponding testimony due to
unreliability 314 or irrelevance, 315 or the courts found that it had minimal
probative value because the evidence could not accurately assess a
defendant’s past mental state. 316
In United States v. Mezvinsky,317 PET scan evidence was introduced to
show that the defendant, who was accused of multiple counts of fraud, was
incapable of intentionally deceiving a person or institution, which was the
requisite mens rea for his crime. 318 The district court found the scans
unhelpful and irrelevant since they could not provide concrete information
concerning the defendant’s capacity to deceive.319 Accordingly, the PET
scans were inadmissible for lack of reliability and for irrelevance to the
specific legal question at issue.320
Similarly, in United States v. Puerto, 321 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
lower court’s decision to exclude the defendant’s expert under a Daubert
analysis. 322 In an attempt to demonstrate that the defendant could not have
formed the mens rea necessary for fraud and money laundering, the
defendant sought to introduce expert testimony about his diagnoses of
progressive vascular dementia. 323 The defendant wanted to show a brain
scan indicating that a region of his brain was “cavitated out” and the brain
tissue was replaced by fluid, indicating damage to numerous brain
functions, including comprehension and executive planning. 324 The
defendant also sought to introduce an EEG scan to pinpoint the causes of
the dementia. 325 The district court excluded the testimony and the
neuroimaging evidence under Daubert and Rule 702 for lack of
relevance. 326 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the experts were
unable to testify “with any medical certainty” that the defendant lacked the
requisite intent at the time of the offenses and that the evidence could not
(2d Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that neuroimaging evidence which could elucidate nature of defendant’s brain
function was improperly excluded); United States v. Williams, No. CR 06-00079, 2009 WL
424583 (D. Haw. Feb. 20, 2009) (noting “considerable debate exists” about the reliability of
functional neuroimaging, but entertaining the thought that it could be relevant).
314. See, e.g., Gigante, 982 F. Supp. at 147–48 (finding that the scans were “dubious,
based upon speculative scientific theories lacking full development” and the “opinions of
[the] defendant’s experts were unreliable”).
315. See Mezvinsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 674–75; Puerto, 2010 WL 3191765, at *13.
316. See Mezvinsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 674–75; Puerto, 2010 WL 3191765, at *13.
317. 206 F. Supp. 2d 661 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
318. Id. at 667–69.
319. Id. at 675 (“[T]here is . . . no evidence that Mezvinsky’s PET-identified brain
abnormalities had any pertinence to his capacity to deceive . . . .”).
320. Id. The prosecution argued that the PET scans could mislead and confuse the jury
and should be excluded under Rule 403. The court, however, did not reach that question in
its analysis. See id.
321. No. 07-14097, 2010 WL 3191765 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2010).
322. Id. at *12–13.
323. Id. at *9–10.
324. Id. at *10.
325. Id.
326. Id. at *13.
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“help the jury decide a factual dispute.”327 In both Mezvinsky and Puerto,
functional brain scans were excluded under Daubert for lack of
relevance. 328
B. Arguments for Admitting Functional Neuroimaging Evidence
Although many scholars and commentators oppose introducing
functional neuroimaging into the courtroom, 329 others advocate for its
admission. 330 This section discusses arguments in favor of admitting
functional neuroimaging. Proponents argue that functional neuroimaging
evidence may be sufficiently reliable,331 relevant, and useful, 332 and that its
probative value outweighs the risk of prejudicing or misleading the jury. 333
1. Criticism Is Not Based on Legal Doctrine
Substantial research supports the notion that functional brain scans
reliably report on brain function, 334 but the legal community has been slow
to accept this. Some contend that the legal community’s reluctance to
embrace functional neuroimaging is not so much about the substance of the
science as it is an unwillingness or hesitance to build a collaborative bridge
between science and the law. 335 Professor Oliver Goodenough and
Vermont Assistant Attorney General Micaela Tucker suggest that lawyers
are “too bound by current paradigms to see the leaps that could be made in
doctrine and practice” 336 by incorporating scientific findings into the legal
arena. Resistance to neuroimaging evidence, they argue, may be based
more on intransigence than on legal doctrine.337

327. Id.
328. See id.; United States v. Mezvinsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d 661, 677 (E.D. Pa. 2002); see
also Trapp v. Spencer, 479 F.3d 53, 58, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of habeas
petition seeking new PET scan results in part because the brain scan was conducted twenty
years after the murder and may not have been representative of the defendant’s brain
condition when the defendant committed the crime).
329. See supra Part II.A.1.
330. See, e.g., Feigenson, supra note 89, at 44–48; Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 57,
at 80–82; Johnson, supra note 55, at 39–40; Yang et al., supra note 48, at 79–80; see also
Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 106, at 261. See generally Kittay, supra note 115.
331. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience,
Lie Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1205–06 (2010).
332. See, e.g., Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 57, at 80; Erin Ann O’Hara, How
Neuroscience Might Advance the Law, in LAW & THE BRAIN, supra note 40, 21, 27–31;
Shafi, supra note 72, at 29–30.
333. See, e.g., Feigenson, supra note 89, at 44–45, 48.
334. See generally Fabian, supra note 106; Raine, supra note 109; Raine & Yang, supra
note 106; Sapolsky, supra note 40; Robert W. Thatcher et al., Quantitative EEG and the
Frye and Daubert Standards of Admissibility, 34 CLINICAL ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY 1
(2003) (arguing that qEEG is sufficiently reliable to pass evidentiary standards).
335. See Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 57, at 80.
336. Id. at 82; see also Pettit, Jr. supra note 74, at 340 (concluding that brain imaging is
constantly evolving and, should brain imaging reach the point of admissibility, courts should
be open to this new form of evidence “even if the result is a profound transformation of how
[our legal system] operates”).
337. Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 57, at 80–82.
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2. Functional Neuroimaging Is Sufficiently Reliable to Pass Daubert
Responding to critics’ concerns about experts’ use of probability and
inference when interpreting functional neuroimaging, 338 Professors Erica
Beecher-Monas and Edgar Garcia-Rill concede that the testimony is
necessarily couched in terms of probability, inference, and correlation
rather than certainty. 339 They argue that this is standard scientific practice:
causality cannot be determined with certainty, so probability and inference
are necessary to reach conclusions. 340 Using probability and inference
“do[es] not . . . make [the observations] useless or unrealistic.” 341 BeecherMonas and Garcia-Rill argue that when judges act as gatekeepers, they must
allow for the “probabilistic nature of science” when considering the
admissibility of functional neuroimaging evidence. 342 Echoing Daubert,
they argue that the judge’s role as gatekeeper is not to decide whether the
proposed scientific theory is correct, but only to determine whether it meets
the criteria qualifying it as a “sound science.” 343 So long as the proffered
testifying experts can present their opinions with sufficient supporting data
and explain how the hypotheses were tested while accounting for
conflicting opinions in true scientific fashion, functional neuroimaging
meets Daubert standards and should be admitted. 344
3. Excluding Functional Brain Imaging Would Deny Defendants Their
“Right to Voice”
Defendants would be more likely than prosecutors to introduce functional
neuroimaging evidence, primarily about past mental states.345 Proponents
argue that excluding such evidence would deprive defendants of their right
to testify on their own behalf, coined by one scholar as a defendant’s “right
to voice.” 346 In Rock v. Arkansas, 347 the Supreme Court affirmed a
338. See supra Part II.A.1–2.
339. See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 106, at 253, 257, 276.
340. Id. at 253 (“The probability that one event caused another can be increased or
decreased, depending on how well new evidence fits with the guiding theory, but it cannot
be determined with absolute certainty.”); see also Nance, supra note 277, at 193 (arguing
that courts misunderstand Daubert’s reliability requirement and that evidence is not a
“binary, all-or-nothing concept of reliability—that evidence is either reliable or unreliable,”
but that “the reliability of evidence is a matter of degree”).
341. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 106, at 256.
342. Id. at 257.
343. Id. at 262; see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
344. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 106, at 256, 262, 275–76.
345. Defendants could also introduce such evidence to boost their credibility by
attempting to show they are not falsifying their testimony, see supra note 115, but that is
beyond the scope of this Note.
346. SLOBOGIN, supra note 185, at 40, 53–55 (pointing out that when defendants wish to
testify on their own behalf, both First and Sixth Amendment protections are triggered).
Slobogin notes that a defendant’s right to testify is particularly important when the testimony
concerns the defendant’s mental state. Id.; see Greely, supra note 113, at 131–32 (discussing
a constitutional right, based on the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, for criminal defendants to
present evidence in their own defense).
347. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
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defendant’s right to testify on his or her own behalf, holding that that
defendants must be able to present “[their] version of the events for which
[they are] on trial” unless they are “so untrustworthy” or “immune to the
traditional means of evaluating credibility.” 348 Supporters suggest that
functional neuroimaging evidence provides experts with scientific facts
upon which they can draw inferences “that not only support the defendant’s
story but may be the only source for it.”349 Excluding such evidence would
“deprive the criminal defendant of the voice the Constitution
guarantees.” 350 Furthermore, with no easy or direct way to assess accuracy
about a defendant’s past mental state, an expert could offer the judge and
jury important information about the defendant based on the expert’s
professional experience and through the expert’s opinion informed by the
neuroimaging evidence.351
In United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 352 the Ninth Circuit found that
the district court abused its discretion when it excluded the defendant’s
functional neuroimaging evidence.353 The court concluded that without the
evidence, the jury could not reach a reasonable conclusion about whether
the defendant possessed the requisite mental state, whether the defendant
was liable, or whether he had a valid defense. 354 Because the district court
excluded the evidence, the Ninth Circuit found that he was “‘deprived . . .
of a fair opportunity to defend himself.’” 355
4. Functional Brain Imaging Has Probative Value
Proponents also assert that functional neuroimaging evidence is relevant
to contested legal questions at trial. Neuroimaging evidence is not a “brainprint in isolation from all other evidence” that independently proves a
defendant’s guilt or innocence.356 Rather, it is “one factor among many”
that can help the finder of fact reach an informed decision about a
defendant’s innocence or guilt. 357 For example, such evidence can show
that a defendant has impaired brain function, indicating an increased
348. Id. at 61.
349. SLOBOGIN, supra note 185, at 55; see also Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note
106, at 261 (“Mental state is such an important facet of our understanding of criminal
responsibility that judges need to be open to the new ideas emerging in the field of brain
science.”).
350. SLOBOGIN, supra note 185, at 55.
351. Id. at 40, 43–48, 51; Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 106, at 261.
352. 472 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2006).
353. See id. at 654.
354. See id. at 656.
355. Id. (quoting United States v. Slaughter, 891 F.2d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 1989)).
356. Yang et al., supra note 48, at 79.
357. Id.; see also United States v. Williams, No. CR 06-00079, 2009 WL 424583, at *5–6
(D. Haw. Feb. 20, 2009) (noting that while it is controversial, functional neuroimaging can
potentially enlighten the fact-finder on questions of the defendant’s mental intent and
culpability); Stephen H. Dinwiddie, Biological Causes of Criminality and Expert
Testimony—Some Cautionary Thoughts, in THE SCIENCE, TREATMENT, AND PREVENTION OF
ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIORS: APPLICATION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 24-1, at 24-9
(Diana H. Fishbein ed., 2000); O’Hara, supra note 332, at 28–30 (describing neuroscience as
a contributing factor that can help the fact-finder decide on ultimate issues of culpability).
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likelihood of disinhibition or aggressive behavior. 358 It would be up to the
fact-finder to decide how to weigh the evidence or whether to rely on it at
all. 359 If the question concerns a defendant’s mental state at the time of the
incident, functional neuroimaging can help the jury reach an ultimate
conclusion about whether the defendant was or was not of a particular
frame of mind. 360
5. Probative Value of Functional Neuroimaging Outweighs
Its Prejudicial Risk
Responding to those who wish to exclude functional neuroimaging under
Rule 403, 361 proponents assert that such evidence will not overly mislead or
prejudice the jury. 362 Others believe that jurors would be no less capable of
critically evaluating functional neuroimaging evidence than they would be
at critically evaluating other types of scientific evidence.363 Still others
argue that the probative value of the evidence is much too strong to exclude
it based on a possible prejudicial effect, and certainly too strong for per se
exclusion. 364 Professor Neal Feigenson even suggests that the best way to
obtain reliable functional neuroimaging-based testimony and to decrease its
prejudicial effect is to admit more of that type of evidence and allow the
experts and lawyers to educate the jurors. 365 Professor Feigenson aligns
himself with Daubert and states that the best way to evaluate the merits of
functional neuroimaging evidence is to present competing opinions to argue
over the interpretations and results of the brain scans. 366 This, he argues,
358. See supra notes 40, 106 and accompanying text.
359. Dinwiddie, supra note 357, at 24-9; see also O’Hara, supra note 332, at 29–30;
Note, Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2142, 2153 (2003)
(noting that jurors should be the arbiters of as-applied reliability).
360. O’Hara, supra note 332, at 30.
361. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text (explaining Rule 403); supra Part
II.A.4.
362. E.g., Feigenson, supra note 89, at 44–48; Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 57, at
72 (“[P]otential for prejudice does not make neuroscience evidence inadmissible per se.”);
Schauer, supra note 331, at 1210; Sinnott-Armstrong et al., supra note 301, at 370.
363. Perlin, supra note 237, at 890 (quoting Dov Fox, Brain Imaging and the Bill of
Rights: Memory Detection Technologies and American Criminal Justice, 8 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 34, 36 (2008)); see also Schauer, supra note 331, at 1210 n.103 (citing numerous
studies which suggest that juries are not as ill-equipped at evaluating scientific evidence as is
commonly assumed).
364. Feigenson, supra note 89, at 44–48; Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 57, at 72
(“[A] potential for prejudice does not make neuroscience evidence inadmissible per se.”);
see also Schauer, supra note 331, at 1210 (“This reliance on juror incompetence to justify
excluding neuroscience evidence seems misplaced . . . or, at the very least, premature.”);
Sinnott-Armstrong et al., supra note 301, at 370 (noting that, if used properly, brain scans
might actually inform the jury and lead to more accurate conclusions instead of misleading
the jury).
365. Feigenson, supra note 89, at 44–48.
366. Id. at 47–48; see Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 57, at 72 (“[J]urors’ biases and
misunderstandings are better held in check by more information rather than less.”); see also
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (stating that “[v]igorous
cross-examination” and “presentation of contrary evidence” are the “traditional and
appropriate means” to challenge scientific evidence).

2011]

A CASE FOR FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING

395

would not only encourage juries to view the testimony critically, but would
also allow legal judgments to “be rendered consistently with the best
available scientific knowledge.” 367 Scholars also counter critics’ concern
about the “Christmas tree effect” 368 by pointing out that admitting
functional neuroimaging evidence would not prevent fact-finders from
reaching a guilty verdict if they feel it is deserved, 369 a result corroborated
by numerous cases. 370
III. BRINGING FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING INTO THE COURTROOM:
NECESSARY AND USEFUL
Brain imaging technologies have progressed rapidly over the past thirty
years. 371 One can only assume that the technology will continue to
progress in the future, likely at a faster rate than before. 372 When it comes
to bringing functional neuroimaging into the courtroom, scholars and
judges alike have resisted doing so under Daubert and the federal
admissibility standards. 373 At the same time, forensic individualization
evidence is continually admitted at trial despite significant and egregious
scientific failings. 374 Only a few courts subject the evidence to proper
Daubert hearings, and even fewer still conduct evidentiary analyses.375
This has resulted in an evidentiary double standard in federal criminal
courts in which the forensic individualization evidence gets a “free pass”
around Daubert while functional neuroimaging evidence cannot even leave
the starting gate. This double standard should not be allowed to continue.
Part III argues that federal judges should carefully consider admitting
functional neuroimaging evidence when it is offered in criminal trials,
367. Feigenson, supra note 89, at 48.
368. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (describing what some refer to as the
“Christmas tree effect”).
369. Feigenson, supra note 89 at 44–48; see Perlin, supra note 237, at 890; see also Ayd
& Troeger, supra note 184, at 38 (“Jurors should participate in legal decision making, even
when scientific or technical issues are involved.”); Friedman, supra note 184, at 1061–64
(arguing that jurors would not be unfairly prejudiced if presented with such evidence, and
that they can still effectively serve as finders of fact).
370. See, e.g., United States v. Hammer, 404 F. Supp. 2d 676, 792–93 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(admitting neuroevidence at habeas corpus hearing but ultimately finding it unpersuasive as
to defendant’s competency), appeal dismissed, 564 F.3d 628 (3d Cir. 2009); State v.
Anderson, 79 S.W.3d 420, 429 (Mo. 2002) (despite neurologist’s testimony of defendant’s
brain damage, jury still found defendant guilty and sentenced him to death), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 196 S.W.3d 28 (Mo. 2006); Anemona Hartocollis, Jury
Finds Writer Guilty of Sex Attack, Rejecting Psychiatric Defense, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2007, at B3; see also United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 656 (9th Cir. 2006)
(reversing the lower court’s decision to exclude evidence while noting that the jury is
capable of reaching a conclusion and should have been presented with the evidence).
371. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.
372. In fact, researchers recently developed technology that allows for significantly faster
fMRI scans. See New Technologies Allow for Faster Brain FMRIs, MEDGADGET.COM (Jan.
12, 2011), http://www.medgadget.com/archives/2011/01/new_technologies_allow_for_faster
_brain_fmris.html.
373. See supra Part II.A.
374. See supra Part I.D.4.
375. See supra Part I.D.4.

396

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

especially in light of the suspect quality of forensic evidence currently
streaming into the courtroom. Admissibility should not be given carte
blanche, however. Proper evidence standards must be maintained.
Functional neuroimaging evidence can be potentially confusing and courts
do have the right to control such evidence, but it should not be excluded per
se. Fully utilizing the adversarial process of our court system would help
the judge and the jury alike understand the nature, assumptions, and
consequences of functional neuroimaging evidence.
A. Balancing the Evidence Presented to the Jury
The NRC’s report thoroughly documented the dearth of significant or
verifiable science 376 underlying the aptly named “non-science forensic
sciences” known as forensic individualization.377 Yet, as discussed above,
there have been few attempts to improve these practices. 378 Forensic
individualization sciences are still frequently admitted in federal
courtrooms, often without undergoing a Daubert analysis; for those that do
conduct a Daubert inquiry, the analysis is certainly not a rigorous one.379
The lax admissibility threshold imposed on prosecutors 380 has led to many
wrongful convictions, some of which have been overturned.381 It remains
unclear, however, just how many convictions premised on faulty or
fraudulent forensic evidence are never revisited due to a lack of DNA or
other exculpatory evidence.382
These deplorable consequences of evidence standards gone awry can be
partially mitigated by leveling the evidentiary playing field. Functional
neuroimaging evidence could provide defendants with the opportunity to
present a fuller defense to the jury. Often unable to testify about their own
mental state, defendants could offer functional neuroimaging evidence as
the only source for such evidence and their only hope for presenting it
before a judge or jury. 383
It seems unlikely that judges will ban forensic individualization evidence
in the near future, especially because most judges readily and even blindly
admit it without first examining it under Daubert. 384 The NRC report
clearly lays out the dangers and wholly inadequate science behind the
widely admitted forensic individualization sciences. 385 Hopefully, future
litigation will directly address the report to help turn the tide of this
evidentiary debacle, but any change surely will be slow. The case law
demonstrates the judicial system’s long-running allegiance to the forensic
376. See supra Part I.D.3.
377. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.
379. See supra Part I.D.4.
380. See supra note 223 and accompanying text; supra Part I.D.2.
381. See supra notes 226–32 and accompanying text (discussing wrongful convictions
based on faulty forensic evidence later overturned by DNA exonerations).
382. See supra note 200.
383. See supra Part II.B.3; supra notes 352–55 and accompanying text.
384. See supra Part I.D.4; supra note 251 and accompanying text.
385. See supra Part I.D.3.
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sciences, however misplaced that allegiance may be. 386 As one scholar
mused, “We have been marinated in a culture of faith in the validity of the
non-science forensic sciences.” 387 With this in mind, Judge Gertner’s
lament reverberates with renewed urgency: “[W]e should require more”
from our criminal justice system. 388 The NRC’s recommendation for
federal oversight and regulation 389 is not only appropriate; it is necessary.
If heeded, it will usher in a marked improvement in the reliability and
validity of forensics.
Contrast forensic evidence’s free ride into federal courts, bypassing
Daubert, with one scholar’s call for a moratorium on admitting all
neuroscience into evidence until a regulatory agency can verify its
reliability according to federal standards. 390 Such a moratorium is an
unnecessarily drastic measure, especially considering the scientific validity
underlying functional neuroimaging methodologies. 391 Absent a similar
ban on forensic individualization evidence, courts should be even more
willing to admit functional neuroimaging evidence. Judges should at least
be no more hesitant to admit functional neuroimaging than they are to admit
forensic individualization evidence. Doing so would add needed balance to
the currently ravaged vista of criminal evidence.
This imbalance is compounded by the pro-prosecution bias in evidentiary
hearings. 392 A defendant has little chance of presenting a useful defense at
trial if judges employ an almost knee-jerk response in rejecting their
challenges to forensic evidence while mostly granting prosecutors’ motions
to exclude defendants’ forensic evidence. 393 Providing a jury with
functional neuroimaging evidence would help the jury develop a more
For example, if the
complete understanding of the defendant.394
prosecution presents the jury with particularly incriminating, yet
scientifically questionable, forensic evidence, it would be a disservice to
justice to silence the defendant by excluding functional neuroimaging
evidence. Forensic evidence can be used to place the defendant at the scene
of the crime 395 and would essentially be the “smoking gun” to a jury—
unless the defendant can try to counterbalance it with evidence that he may
not have been able to form the requisite intent, was unaware of his actions,
or should not be held as accountable as someone with no evidence of brain
dysfunction. Perhaps the jury will find that the defendant’s aggression was
partially caused by brain dysfunction, and perhaps not. Whether the jury
386. See supra notes 249–65 and accompanying text (discussing federal courts’ resistance
to challenging the pedigree of forensic evidence despite recognizing the evidence’s
weaknesses).
387. Saks, supra note 206, at 336.
388. See supra notes 262–65 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 244–48 and accompanying text.
390. Greely & Illes, supra note 90, at 395–404.
391. See supra notes 338–44 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 191; 234–38 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 234–37 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 357–59 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 228–32 and accompanying text.
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will find such evidence persuasive is a separate issue, and beyond the scope
of this Note. The important point is that the evidence should be presented
to the jury. After all, a verdict can wholly depend on whether any single
piece of evidence places some amount of doubt in the jury’s mind. 396
The critiques raised against functional neuroimaging evidence397 apply
with just as much force—perhaps even more—to forensic individualization
evidence. Critics argue that no regulations govern the use and interpretation
of functional neuroimaging. 398 Yet forensic individualization also lacks
standardization and regulations governing its use. 399 Opponents claim that
functional neuroimaging is unreliable because it necessarily involves
interpretations based on correlations rather than direct causation, relying on
comparisons drawn from a generalized “normal” population. 400 Yet
forensic individualization rests entirely on probability and draws
extensively from the expert’s subjective analysis.401 Critics also reject
functional brain scans for their inability to represent a defendant’s past
mental state accurately, given the dynamic and prohibitively complex
interconnectedness of the brain. 402 However, forensic individualization
depends heavily on highly similar methods of analysis. Forensic experts
may analyze physical, unique traits observed on physical objects, 403 but
experts usually have access only to samples, which are often incomplete
and sometimes even temporally dynamic. 404 For example, bite marks on
the skin change over time. 405 They can be easily distorted by the elasticity
of the skin, distribution of force of the bite, variations in swelling and
healing, time, fitness of the victim, and other factors. 406 When forensic
experts analyze these marks, they necessarily draw inferential connections
similar to those drawn by functional brain imaging experts, analyzing the
measured and collected results and formulating conclusions drawn from
their subjective experiences, observations, and training. 407
The analyses of these two types of forensic evidence may involve similar
methods, but the validity of the scientific methodology employed for
functional neuroimaging and forensic individualization differs greatly. The
NRC report, 408 numerous scholars and commentators, 409 and recently even
396. See supra note 369–70 and accompanying text.
397. See supra Part II.A.
398. See supra Part II.A.1.
399. See supra notes 244–48 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 62–65, 291–97 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 203–07 and accompanying text.
402. See supra Part II.A.2.
403. This includes blood, bite marks, etchings on tool marks, fingerprints, and the like.
See supra Part I.D.1.
404. See Moriarty & Saks, supra note 17, at 26.
405. See NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 174. Similar problems of temporal dynamism
occur with toolmark analysis. See Moriarty & Saks, supra note 17, at 26.
406. NRC REPORT, supra note 166, at 174.
407. Moriarty & Saks, supra note 17, at 26 (“[I]t is necessary [for forensic analysts] to
use methods of analysis that are capable of making useful estimates about samples or a
temporally changing target.”). The same holds true for inferential leaps that experts make
when they only have partial fingerprints. Id.
408. See supra Part I.D.3.
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some courts 410 have documented the almost complete dearth of scientific
support for forensic individualization. Daubert requires that scientific
evidence be scientifically reliable to be admissible, but forensic
individualization evidence is nothing if not unscientific. Functional
neuroimaging, on the other hand, is based on scientifically sound
methodologies. 411
B. Normative, Not Scientific, Issues
Not only will functional neuroimaging restore balance to the palette of
evidence admitted in criminal trials, but it would also properly restore factfinding duties to the jury. 412 Judges who exclude the evidence without
conducting proper Daubert analyses evaluate the merits and conclusions
drawn from the evidence as opposed to the underlying methodologies.
Daubert specifically prohibits judges from doing just that.413 If the
evidence were admitted, juries would be free to use it as they see fit.414
Experts would testify about the implications of the brain scans and how the
scans might help the jury reach an ultimate conclusion about a defendant’s
mental state; 415 the expert’s testimony, however, would by no means be
dispositive. 416 The jury would decide what to do with the evidence and
how much weight to grant it. 417 In other words, jurors would decide how to
weave the functional neuroimaging evidence into the fabric of the rest of
the evidence presented to them—that is, if the jury decides to consider the
evidence at all.
When faced with functional neuroimaging evidence, a judge should not
allow scientific questions to cloud his gatekeeping duties. 418 Those
questions have already been answered with ample research supporting the
scientific methodologies employed. 419 Even if a court were to reject the
supporting scientific research, the evidence most likely would pass
Daubert’s requirements for scientific validity. Thus, judges should view
the evidence from a normative or judicial standard, rather than a scientific
one, and let the jury evaluate it. Jurors are the arbiters of truth, the factfinders who must determine normative questions of how to weigh a piece of
Treating the evidence
evidence, and ultimately, of culpability. 420

409. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 262–65, 274 and accompanying text.
411. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 54, at 1177 (noting that the methodology of
functional neuroimaging is scientifically sound and would survive both Daubert and Frye
analyses); supra Parts I.B.1, II.B.2.
412. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 125, 170–73 and accompanying text.
414. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
415. See supra Parts II.B.2, II.B.4, note 349 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 161–65 and accompanying text.
417. See supra Part II.B.4; see also supra notes 270–73 and accompanying text.
418. Once such question is whether the science of functional neuroimaging is sufficiently
reliable to pass Daubert.
419. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
420. See supra Part I.C.3.

400

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

normatively mitigates concern for misleading the jury because the jury
could simply discard the evidence as unpersuasive. 421
Furthermore, litigating parties should use cross-examination and the
adversarial system to focus and clarify the issue for the jury. 422 As
Professor Feigenson advocates, juries should be presented with more, not
less, neuroimaging evidence. 423 The Supreme Court has endorsed this
jurisprudential philosophy, both in Daubert and elsewhere, 424 declaring that
the adversarial nature of our legal system is keenly capable of discovering
the truth. 425 Thus, courts should consider admitting neuroimaging evidence
not only because it likely passes Daubert’s “science” requirements,426 but
also because at trial, both sides can properly present and explain the
evidence so it does not mislead or prejudice the jury.
In Sandoval-Mendoza, 427 the Ninth Circuit placed a premium on
admitting functional neuroimaging evidence so that the jury could reach a
reasonable conclusion about the defendant’s mental state.428 Viewing the
evidence normatively, the court recognized that only the jury could evaluate
the evidence; excluding it therefore constituted reversible error.429 That the
court reversed the evidentiary decision is significant because the standard of
review for evidentiary hearings is abuse of discretion. 430 The reversal was
thus a resounding vote of confidence in favor of admitting the evidence and
its utility in assisting the jury. 431 As highlighted by Sandoval-Mendoza, the
jury should not be underestimated, and neither should the jury nor the
defendant be denied the possible benefits of functional neuroimaging
evidence per se.
This Note does not advocate for judges to freely admit functional
neuroimaging evidence. But, since the evidence most likely survives a
Daubert analysis, 432 and assuming that the evidence is sufficiently
probative, 433 federal judges should strongly consider admitting it more
frequently in criminal trials. Judges should also strive to ensure that
admitted evidence continues to be reliable, and if necessary, to regulate the
extent of the testimony through procedural methods such as carefully
crafted jury instructions 434 or directed verdicts. 435 Furthermore, agencies
421. See supra note 370 and accompanying text (citing cases where juries disregarded
functional neuroimaging evidence); see also supra notes 362–63 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 366–70 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 365–67 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
425. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992) (quoting California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
426. See supra notes 339–44 and accompanying text.
427. 472 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2006); see supra notes 352–55 and accompanying text.
428. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
429. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d. at 656.
430. See supra notes 137, 151 and accompanying text.
431. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
432. See supra Part II.B.2.
433. See supra Part II.B.4–5.
434. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
435. See supra note 135.
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such as the Institute of Medicine should establish regulatory boards to
govern the research, development, and application of functional
neuroimaging evidence and to supervise the imaging methods. 436 Doing so
would ensure continued reliability while serving the interests of justice by
allowing litigating parties to introduce relevant and probative evidence.
CONCLUSION
Courts considering functional neuroimaging evidence have applied an
evidentiary double standard. Charged with gatekeeping duties under
Daubert, they are supposed to prevent empirically unreliable evidence from
entering the courtroom. But in federal criminal trials, judges often turn a
blind eye towards unscientific forensic individualization evidence, refusing
to analyze it under Daubert. Instead, it is often inappropriately admitted
into evidence because of its pedigree. Functional neuroimaging evidence,
however, has been met with a more skeptical eye and subjected to
significantly stricter Daubert standards than its forensic counterparts. This
has resulted in an unfair, and pro-prosecution, evidentiary bias.
Meanwhile, scholars and commentators continue to debate the merits and
detriments of functional neuroimaging evidence. But most critics of
functional neuroimaging evidence do not consider the disparity in
evidentiary standards that exists in federal criminal trials. Accordingly,
judges should carefully and fairly examine functional neuroimaging
evidence when offered in federal criminal trials. It should not be excluded
out of hand. As is frequently the case in criminal trials where this type of
evidence can make a difference, the stakes will be high and the needs will
be immediate. Jurors should be presented with the evidence—all the
evidence possible—so that they can determine how best to weave together
the various pieces to create a complete tapestry of evidence.
John Hinckley, Jr. was found not guilty by reason of insanity after his
lawyers showed the jury pictures of his atrophied brain. Was the jury
correct in finding him not guilty? Was the verdict largely due to the
pictures of his brain that were displayed to the jury? Those questions
remain unanswered. But now, thirty years later, when both sides have a
better understanding of neuroimaging evidence and can more fully prepare
for its use in court, neither juries nor defendants should be denied the
benefits provided by functional neuroimaging evidence.

436. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

